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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION:
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS*
FRITZ W. SCHARPFt
I. THE PoLmcA QUETON AND THE COURT'S
"DuTy TO SAY WHAT THE LAW Is"
IN recent years, the Supreme Court's use of the political question
doctrine has come to be regarded as a touchstone for the validity of
competing theories of judicial review. The issue is joined on whether
the doctrine is, or can be, employed as a discretionary technique for
avoiding questions of law on which the decision of cases properly
before the courts would otherwise depend. For the protagonists of the
* This article is an attempt to restate and elaborate some of the conclusions which I
have reached in a book-length study, published in Germany, of the political question
doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States, SCtrPF, GmxzzNz Dm
RicP uHcsEN VERANTWORTUNG: DiE PouncAL Qutsro, DoK'nuN IN Dan R.cuEaSPonmG
DEs AmmuKA iscmnN SupRmE CouRT (1965).
Unlike the book, this article obviously cannot carry the burden of a descriptive
presentation of the Court's political question practice. This limitation is a serious one
because, with one exception (PosT, THi Supmm.x CouxR AND PoLrrc, .. QuasnoNs (1936))
which is by now somewhat dated, American authors dealing with the doctrine have tended
to use the cases in a rather selective fashion. They have cited and discussed primarily
those decisions which seemed to support their particular theory about why and how the
doctrine was employed (or ought to be employed) and disregarded both political question
cases which did not seem to fit their explanation and cases decided on their merits in
areas where, according to the theories, the doctrine should have been applied. See e.g.
Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MNN. L Rv. 485
(1924); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HAnv. L. , v. 338 (1924); Weston, Political
Questions, 38 HARv. L. R-v. 296 (1925); Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self.
Limitation, 39 HARv. L. Rav. 221 (1925); Frank, Political Questions, in SuREEre Comr
AND SuPRszuE LAw 36 (Cahn ed. 1954); Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. Dr.
L.J. 439 (1965); Strum, The Supreme Court and the "Political Question" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The New School for Political and Social Science, 1964).
There is, therefore, no easily available summary of the Court's actual practice to which
I could refer in lieu of my own presentation. Even though my concern in this article is
primarily analytical and evaluative, it will thus be necessary to sketch in at least those
areas of the case law which, in my opinion, have not been fully considered in American
treatments of the political question.
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"classical theory" of judicial review, there can be no such discretion.
They insist, as did John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,1 that the
power of judicial review rests ultimately upon the constitutional duty
of the judiciary "to say what the law is"-that is, to exercise its inde-
pendent judgment in finding, interpreting and applying the law (in-
cluding the law of the Constitution) whenever the decision of a case
and controversy should depend on it. To acknowledge that the courts
might be free to disregard this duty by treating a "political" determina-
tion as conclusive of some questions of law would destroy the assump-
tion of a judicial duty which is fundamental for the classical theory.
This difficulty would disappear, however, if it could be shown that in
those instances in which the courts do in fact defer without inquiry to a
decision by the political departments, this deference is itself compelled
by the constitutional allocation of competence to decide. Professor
Wechsler, to whom we owe a classical reaffirmation of the classical
theory,2 has made it clear that compatibility with the logic of Marbury
v. Madison requires that the political question doctrine be understood
as a command of the Constitution: "all the doctrine can defensibly
imply is that the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitu-
tion has committed to another agency of government the autonomous
determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an inter-
pretation" but which "is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to
abstain or intervene."
3
These categorical assertions were made in response to the challenge
which Judge Learned Hand had delivered from the same rostrum a
year before. Judge Hand, who professed himself unpersuaded by the
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-178 (1803). The full passage reads as follows:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both
the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution; or con-
formable to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which
of these conflicting rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty.
In my reading of the opinion, this is the only passage where Marshall addresses himself
to the crucial issue of why the courts should not have to accept the (implicit) legislative
determination that a statute is constitutional; if this passage is to make sense at all, it
must rest on (constitutional) notions about the independence of the judicial power with
regard to the determination of all questions upon which the decision of a case and con-
troversy properly before the court should depend.
See also the re-affirmation (and over-statement) of the Marbury rationale in Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958).
2. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rzv. 1,
1-6 (1959).
3. Id. at 7-9.
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classical theory, had relied on the political question doctrine to show
that the Supreme Court was not itself prepared to take literally its
supposed duty to decide independently all questions of law when-
ever the outcome of a case would depend upon them. If the Court was
at liberty to accept a political determination for some constitutional
issues, then it would follow that judicial review generally "need not be
exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks it sees, an invasion of the
Constitution." Not the avoidance but the exercise of judicial review
would then require a positive justification in the individual case,
depending upon "how importunately the occasion demands an an-
swer." And Judge Hand was quite explicit in pointing out that short
of destructive conflicts of competence between the federal government
and the states or among the departments of the federal government, the
occasions justifying an exercise of judicial review would be very rare
indeed.4
There is no need for me to discuss the merits of these radically op-
posed positions.5 What is important here is that both sides assume that
there is a close and necessary relationship between the legitimacy of
judicial review and the theories that might explain the political ques-
tion cases.
II. THE PoLrrIcAL QUESTION AND THE TECHNIQUES OF AvomANCE
To a certain degree, this assumption seems to be shared by Professor
Bickel. In his view, the legitimacy of judicial review derives from the
societal value of the Court's institutional capacity to define, pronounce
and (to a degree) enforce principle, the "sober second thought" of the
community.6 But the emphasis of Professor Bickel's analysis is upon the
"passive virtues,"' on the prudential techniques for avoiding the exer-
cise of the Court's reviewing power and on their justification. It is in
this context that he describes the political question as the "culmination
of any progression of devices for withholding the ultimate constitu-
tional judgment of the Supreme Court-and in a sense their sum .... 8
While I share Professor Bickel's understanding of the legitimacy and
function of judicial review and while I am willing to accept much of
his justification for the "passive virtues," I am not persuaded that these
same explanations fully support the political question doctrine. It
4. HAND, THin BILL OF RIGHTS 15-18 and passim (1958).
5. For an indsive critique of both positions, see, BicKEL, THE LEAsr DAc=nous Brnu-ctt
1-14, 46-65 (1962).
6. Id. at 23-28 and passim.
7. Id. at 69-71 and passim. See also, Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 40 (1961).
8. BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 183.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
seems helpful to discuss the techniques of avoidance and their func-
tion in greater detail in order to bring into sharper focus the analytical
contours of the political question itself.
1. Avoidance and the Classical Theory of Judicial Review
It is Professor Bickel's concern to show that even when a constitu-
tional issue is raised in a dispute which is a case and controversy, the
Court is not inevitably confronted with the choice of having either to
uphold a challenged act of government as constitutional, or to strike it
down as violating the Constitution. The Court may do neither by avail-
ing itself of its "almost inexhaustible arsenal of techniques and devices"
for avoiding this ultimate constitutional judgment.0 Such an avoidance,
Professor Bickel maintains, need not rest on constitutional principle;
it may legitimately express the Court's prudential estimate of the de-
sirability of deciding a given constitutional issue under the particular
circumstances.
An avoidance on such prudential grounds would, of course, also con-
flict with the basic assumptions of the classical theory, that the exercise
of judicial review should be the necessary consequence of the Court's
postulated duty to decide all cases properly within its jurisdiction, 0
and to decide constitutional questions whenever the outcome of the
case should depend upon such a question.
Of the "techniques" which Professor Bickel has discussed,"1 the
substantive doctrines of "vagueness" and "delegation" and the restric-
tive interpretation of constitutionally doubtful statutes would seem to
raise the least difficulties in this respect. While the Court will avoid the
ultimate constitutional question of whether Congress could have
adopted measures of this kind if it had expressed its intent less equivo-
cally, it is nevertheless deciding the case upon its merits and is provid-
ing a remedy for the injuries suffered by complainants. And this is, of
course, all that the classical theory can ask the Court to do. Equally
9. Id. at 69-71 and passim. For a critique which, while pointing up some difficulties,
fails to blunt the thrust of Bickel's reasoning, see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1964).
10. The premise that the courts should interpret and apply all law when they are
deciding a case is, of course, logically distinct from the further assumption that the
courts should have to decide all cases properly before them. But Chief Justice Marshall
accepted this second assumption as well, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821), and Mr. Wechsler has approvingly cited this famous passage, WEcILtLan, supra
note 2, at 10.
11. BicszL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 156-164, 169-183 and passim. See generally Am-




compatible with the classical theory, and indeed its indispensable
foundation, is the jurisdictional requirement of "case and contro-
versy," which includes that of "constitutional standing." If judicial
review is premised upon the Court's duty to apply the law to cases
properly before it, the Court, by definition, cannot exercise this power
outside of a case and controversy which, for challenges to governmental
measures, requires the complainant to show an injury to his private
legal interests. Of course, the outer limits of these requirements may
not be very sharply drawn. The Court may, therefore, have some lee-
-way in accepting or rejecting jurisdiction, as appears to be true for tax-
payers' suits 2 and competitors' suits.'3 But this discretion, if it is discre-
12. Compare Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) with Wieman v. Updegraff,
544 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 US. 485 (1952); Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 542 U.S. 429 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1 (1947). The cases seem
to conflict if one accepts, as Justice Jackson did in Doremus, the automatic applicability
of the Frothingham rule for a Supreme Court determination of state taxpayers' suits:
Everson had not shown that his individual tax burden would increase-thus his case
was a "good faith pocket book action" only in the sense that he had challenged "a
measurable disbursement of funds" to which his taxes had contributed. But in this
respect, Everson seems hardly distinguishable from Frothingham; there will be at least
some federal taxpayers whose contribution to the federal budget will be as great or
greater than the contribution of most state taxpayers to the budget of their state, or
even their school district: Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Surey and Summary. 69 YALE
L.J. 895, 917 (1960). For this reason, the Court has been urged to overrule either Everson
or Frothingham (and preferably Frothingham): Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental
Action, 39 MINN. L. REv. 353, 586-391 (1955); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1312 (1961).
The difficulty may disappear, however, once one begins to examine the premise that
"case and controversy" can have only one, unchangeable, meaning for all cases that reach
the Supreme Court. In Frothingham, the Court based its narrow interpretation of this
jurisdictional requirement upon an understanding of the federal allocation of functions
to the three departments of government: the Court's only legitimate function within
that framework is to decide "normal" cases and controversies, and any expansion of that
concept would change this balance. Within the limitations of the guarantee clause how-
ever, the Federal Constitution would seem to leave the states free to divide their
functions of government differently, and to define the "judicial power" of their own
courts somewhat more broadly than Article I of the Federal Constitution does. Thus,
if a state permits its own courts to decide taxpayers' suits, and if a federal question
should be determined by a state court in such a suit, it seems that the "separation-of-
powers" rationale should carry little or no weight for the Supreme Court's definition of
what is a proper "case and controversy" for purposes of its appellate jurisdiction. In this
situation, "case and controversy" might well have a more permissive content, protecting
only the functional requisites for the correctness of the Court's constitutional decision:
a well developed case, litigated by the best possible parties. For instance, if parents are
most vitally and directly affected, taxpayers should not be allowed to raise a church-and-
state issue-a rationale which might help to reconcile Everson and Doremus. There may
be good reasons for permitting federal taxpayers' suits as well, but I am not persuaded
that the alleged logical inconsistency between Frothingham and Everson is one of them.
13. Compare Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 US. 118 (1939) and Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 US. 464 (1938), with Scripps Howard Radio Inc. v. FCC, 316 US. 4
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tion, would not seem to be very broad, and it is usually used to expand,
rather than to contract the scope of the Court's reviewing power.
Compatibility with the logic of Marbury v. Madison becomes more
troublesome when the Court refuses to decide a constitutional case on
the ground that the dispute is not "ripe" for adjudication because the
injury to complainants' legal interests is not yet concrete enough. 14 It is
true that there are cases where the Court will explain its refusal to
determine the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of parties
against whom no sanctions for its violation have yet been applied in
terms which seem to imply that such a dispute is not (yet) a case and
controversy in the constitutional sense.'8 But this rule has suffered so
many exceptions, and there seems to be so little consistency in its appli-
cation,16 that one is forced to assume that the Court finds here a degree
of flexibility, and a freedom of choice, which would be incompatible
with the application of the rigid constitutional standards of case and
controversy.17
This non-constitutional quality of avoidance seems undeniable when
the Court refuses to decide constitutional issues at the instance of
parties claiming that a statute which applies to them is unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional rights of third parties.18 At least
in those instances where "standing to raise the issue" is used to limit
the defenses available to defendants in ordinary criminal or civil pro-
ceedings, there can be no doubt that there is a case and controversy.
(1942) and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The cases are in con-
flict if one assumes that Congress cannot expand "case and controversy" beyond Its
traditional scope (which requires that a plaintiff must be injured in a "right" before lie
can challenge governmental action), and if one further assumes (as the Court did in the
FCC cases) that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 did not create a substantive
right of competitor stations to be free from economic injury caused by the wrongful
grant of a broadcasting license. See Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1313-1314. For a persuasive
answer to this conundrum, see 3 DAvis, ADMINiSTRAiVE LAW, § 22.041 at 222 (1958).
14. See generally Davis, Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review, 68
HARv. L. REv. 1122, 1326 (1955); 3 DAVIS, AD.HNIsrRATIVE LAW, ch. 21 (1958), HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 148-156 (1953).
15. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
16. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Connecticut Mut-Llfe
Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553 (1923).
17. BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 123-125, 143-156 and passim; Davis, Ripeness of
Governmental Action for Judicial Review, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1364-73 (1955); 3 DAvIS,
ADMINisTRATIVE LAW § 21.10 (1958).
18. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17 (1960); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). See generally: 3 DAVIS, AOMNStTArIVE
LAW § 22.06-.07 (1958).
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Defendant will go to jail, will have to pay damages, or will be enjoined
on the basis of a law which he claims is invalid. By deciding such a case
without examining the constitutionality of the statute, the Court seems
clearly to be departing from the premises of Marbury v. Madison. At
least in some cases, the Court has expressly acknowledged the non-con-
stitutional quality of these "rules of practice,"' 9 and it has declared that
it will not apply them in situations where the third parties ultimately
injured are not before the Court and cannot readily vindicate their own
rights or where a loosely drawn criminal statute, while perhaps con-
stitutional as applied to the concrete facts of the case, would deter
others from exercising important constitutional rights in situations for
which such deterrence would be intolerable. -20
Taken together with their exceptions, these rules of ripeness and
non-constitutional standing seem to give the Court considerable free-
dom of choice to decide or avoid constitutional questions upon which
the outcome of a concrete case would depend, and to that extent they
seem to be in conflict with the premises of the classical theory. It is this
undeniable freedom of choice upon which Professor Bickel has built
his theory of the "passive virtues." But before I reach his justifications,
I wish to outline a more limited explanation of these procedural or
jurisdictional techniques of avoidance which, it seems to me, might
account for much of the Court's actual practice on grounds which are,
in a functional2 sense, very intimately related to the power of judicial
review.
2. Avoidance and the Constitutional-Court Function
When the Court is deciding a question of constitutional law or inter-
national law (and, to a somewhat lesser degree, when it is interpreting a
statute), its decisions have an importance and an impact which go far
beyond a mere determination of the rights and duties of the litigants in
the instant case. The rules of precedent and of stare decisis and, more
important, the willingness of the political departments and of the
19. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
20. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500 (1964); Winters v. New York.
333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). See generally Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
21. The term "functional" as used throughout this article refers to the interrelationship
between the nature of the task which the Court is performing and the means which it
can employ for the performance of this task. If its ordinary means prove inadequate for a
particular task, the Court may react either by enlarging its arsenal of means or by
limiting the tasks which it will perform. Both reactions will be daracterized as functional.
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public to accept the Court's pronouncements as the authoritative deter-
mination of the issue, combine to give these decisions of the Supreme
Court virtually the same effect which some of the decisions of the
German Constitutional Court are expressly given by statute: they have
the force of a general law. 2
But while the "legislative effect" of their pronouncements appears to
be quite similar, the process by which the Supreme Court arrives at
such a decision is significantly different from that of a modem constitu-
tional court. The jurisdiction of a specialized constitutional court, like
that of West Germany, is, of course, not defined in terms of "ordinary
litigation." Disputes regarding the constitutional allocation of compe-
tence among the organs of the federal government 23 and between the
federal government and the states (Laender)24 are litigated primarily
by these governmental bodies themselves. Significantly, these bodies
also have standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal and
state legislation on all other grounds, regardless of whether they are
injured in their own rights and duties.25 In order to assure the fullest
presentation of facts and issues, governmental organs which are not
original parties to the dispute are invited to intervene, or are given
opportunity to be heard, in all cases, 26 including those which are ini-
tiated by private parties.27
In view of the active participation of some of the opposition-con-
trolled state governments in constitutional litigation, this system
works to assure the court of the competent presentation of the case
against, as well as for, the constitutionality of governmental measures.
But even in the absence of government participation, the court would
not be restricted by the willingness or ability of the participants to
present information and to clarify issues. The court can and will take
22. § 31 Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgericht (hereinafter cited as BVcrfGG)
of March 12, 1951 (I Bundesgesetzblatt 243) provides:
(1) The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are binding for the con-
stitutional organs of the federal government and of the states as well as for all
courts and administrative officers.
(2) In the instances ... [in which the Court has to determine the validity of federal
or state law] the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court have the force of a
statute. That part of the tenor of decision which has statutory force shall be
promulgated in the Bundesgesetzblatt by the Federal Minister of justice.
23. Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereinafter cited as GG) Art.
93, para. 1, no. 1; BVerfGG §§ 63-67.
24. GG Art. 93, para. I, no. 3; BVerfGG §§ 68-70.
25. GG Art. 93, para. I, no. 2; BVerfGG §§ 76-79.
26. BVerfGG §§ 65, 69, 77, 88.
27. GG Art. 100; BVerfGG §§ 82, para. II; 83, para. II; 94, para. IV.
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evidence and call experts on its own initiative28 in order to inform
itself not only of the "adjudicative facts" of the particular case, but
also, and more important, of the "legislative facts,"20 that is of the sod-
ological, 30 economic,3' or political32 data upon which the validity of a
28. BVerfGG §§ 26-29.
29. These categories have been developed and persistently elaborated by Professor
DAvis, See, e.g., 2 DAvis, AD.ImIm'RATIvE LAw § 15.03 (1958); Davis, An Approach to Prob-
lems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAv. L. REv. 364, 402-410 (1942); Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 945, 952-959 (1955). For a more specific treatment of
constitutional litigation see Baade, Social Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional
Court of West Germany, 23 J. POLrTCs 421 (1961); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitu-
tional Litigation, 1960 SuPREm CotrnT REvmw 75.
30. See, e.g., 6 Entscheidungen des Bundeswerfassungsgerichts [hereinafter cited as
BVerfGE] 389 (1957). In order to determine whether the biological, psychological, socio-
logical and criminological differences between male and female homosexuality were
significant enough to support, against a challenge relying on the constitutional guarantee
of equality of men and women, the provisions of the Criminal Code punishing male
(but not female) homosexuals, the Court requested sua sponte the submission of written
expert opinions and oral testimony by a professor of sociology, a public youth welfare
official, the chief of police of a large city, two psychiatrists, a psychologist, a professor of
medical jurisprudence, and by an Austrian criminologist. The case is fully discussed by
Baade, supra note 29, at 448-450.
31. See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE 377 (1958)---"Pharmacy Case"-- and 11 BVerfGE 30 (1960)-
"Health Insurance Case!' Both cases dealt with the constitutional right to choose one's
profession, and to practice it within the limits of statutory regulation. Art. 12 para. 1
GG. As interpreted by the Court, this guarantee establishes three levels of protection:
(a) regulations of the practice of a profession are permissible if reasonably related to a
legitimate public interest, (b) subjective qualifications for the choice of a profession (e.g.
apprenticeship, examinations, reliability) are permissible to the degree that they are
necessary to protect the public against incompetence, (c) objective qualifications for the
choice of a profession (e.g. certificates of convenience and necessity which may have
the effect of excluding fully qualified applicants) are permissible only where required
by proven or demonstrable dangers to a pre-eminent public interest which cannot be
prevented by appropriate regulations on level (a) or level (b).
In the Pharnacy Case, the Court invalidated a state statute under which otherwise
qualified applicants could be denied permission to open their own pharmacy if this might
endanger the economic viability of neighboring pharmacies. In order to test the state's
contention that such a regulation was necessary for the protection of overriding public
health interests, the Court heard the expert testimony of federal and state public health
officials, the managing director of the Pharmacists' Association of the state, an economist,
the director of the Swiss Public Health Office, the secretary of the Swiss Pharmacists'
Association, and it received the written opinion of the Secretary General of the Fdddration
Internationale Pharmaceutique. On the basis of this investigation, the Court concluded
that the dangers which the state had assumed would follow from an unrestrained freedom
to establish new pharmacies (e.g. concentration of pharmacies in cities at the expen-c of
pharmaceutical service in rural areas and deterioration of professional standards as a
result of cut-throat competition) were either not likely enough, or could be met by other
regulations.
In the Health Insurance Case, the Court invalidated, on the basis of a study made by
a Court-appointed expert, the provisions of the German law of compulsory health insur-
ance which limited the access of doctors to insurance practice by a system of "insurance
1966]
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governmental measure might depend under the court's fact-oriented
interpretation of the Constitution. The hearings before the court
would often remind an American observer of a legislative investigation
physicians' places," established on the basis of one physician for each 500 insured persons.
These places were filled by qualified physicians according to seniority and merit. In view
of the income statistics of the medical profession, the Court was unable to see any serious
dangers which might arise from unrestricted access to insurance practice.
These two cases are more fully discussed by Baade, supra note 29, at 451-56. See generally
Spanner, Standards for Judging Reasonableness of Laws Governing Business Regulation
in the German Federal Republic, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 516 (1960). See further 11 BVerEGE
168 (1960)-certificates of convenience and necessity for taxis and rental cars; 13 BVerfGE
97 (1961)-requirement of a "masters' examination" for taking up a trade; 13 BVerfGE
237 (1961)-closing hours; 16 BVerfGE 147 (1963)-special tax on transportation by In-
dustry-operated trucks; 17 BVerfGE 269 (1964)-prohibition against visiting farms for the
purpose of selling, or soliciting orders for, animal medicine.
In all these cases, the Court upheld or invalidated the challenged regulations on the
basis of a fully articulated examination of their economic impact upon the Individual
or the industry, their effectiveness with respect to the public interests which they were
supposed to serve and the availability of less restrictive alternative methods for serving
these interests. The legitimacy of this broad scope of "economic due process" has been
questioned by authors familiar with the American experience. See, e.g., Ehmke, Prinzipien
der Verfassungsinterpretation, 20 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DEuTsetlER STAATS-
RECHTSLEHRER (1963). But there does not seem to exist any widespread political dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's practice.
32. See, e.g., 8 BVerfGE 51 (1958). The federal income and corporation income tax
laws of 1954 provided for tax-exemptions for contributions to political parties. On the
application of the state government of Hesse (which was joined by the governments of
Hamburg and North-Rhine-WNestphalia-all of which were controlled by the Social
Democratic Party, SPD), the Court declared these provisions unconstitutional on two
grounds. Taking judicial notice (enlightened by the expert opinion of a professor of
political science) of the fact that political parties in Germany differed significantly in
their goals and in their relative concern for the interests of the different social anti
economic groups, the Court found that state support for parties in the form of tax ex-
emptions would have the effect of favoring those parties which primarily represented the
interests of high-income groups and was therefore in violation of the constituntional re-
quirement of "equality of chances" for political parties. Taking further judicial notice
of the fact that campaign contributions may influence the effectiveness of campaigns and
the political strength of a party, and that therefore a voter who is able to make a large
contribution may be more effective in supporting his political preferences than If lie
could only cast his ballot, the Court found that the tax exemptions (in view of progres-
sive taxation) were government subsidies favoring high-income groups, and violated the
citizen's right to equal participation in the political process.
In addition to requesting the opinion of a political science expert, the Court had invited
all political parties to appear at the oral argument. Only the SPD and the Free Democratic
Party, FDP, had availed themselves of this opportunity. The Christian Democrats, CDU,
and the Christian Socialists, CSU, had declined on the ground that the issue was purely
one of constitutional law, and because they felt that they should not enter into a partisan
political dispute before the Court. After the expert and the representatives of the SPD
had presented factual data concerning the scope and effect of campaign contributions,
the Federal Government and the CDU/CSU requested reargument in order to present
further expert testimony. The request was denied by the Court on the ground that its
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-an analogy which seems valid in view of the importance of the "legis-
lative function" which constitutional courts are performing.
By contrast, the American Supreme Court was not designed to decide
constitutional issues per se. Its jurisdiction is defined by the require-
ment of case and controversy, which the Court has restrictively inter-
preted as referring only to the kind of litigation which would be before
the courts even if there were no dispute about a constitutional ques-
tion.33 By this rule alone, governmental organs, federal or state, are
largely prevented from precipitating a constitutional decision even
though for many issues they would seem to be best qualified to present
factual data and realistic and responsible recommendations. Not until
the Judiciary Act of 193734 was the Attorney General authorized to
intervene in any case involving the constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress to which the United States is not a party. Although this rule
allows for the effective defense of federal statutes even in cases liti-
gated among private parties,a5 there is no similar assurance of the pre-
sentation of the states' point of view, or of the case against the con-
stitutionality of federal measures. Amicus briefs may carry part of the
burden of advocacy, and they may, in a not entirely satisfactory fashion,
help to enlighten the Court's judicial notice.30 But they will not, it
seems, alter the basic ground rules of ordinary litigation.
decision was not based on any specific findings as to the ratios of membership dues and
special contributions or as to the amounts of campaign spending by the various parties.
8 BVerfGE 47, 50 (1958).
33. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) and Mus-Krat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911). Professor Davis has argued that the latter case was unsound to begin
with and that, in any case, it lost all meaning after the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act was held constitutional. 3 DAvis, ADmswtSmATwVE LAW § 21.01 (1958). I am not
entirely persuaded. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), where the
Court seems to have seen no conflict between a declaratory judgment and the Mus:rat-
holding. What emerges for me from the concedediy opaque Mifushrat opinion is the
Court's unwillingness to permit the creation of unfamiliar types of proceedings for the
sole purpose of precipitating a constitutional decision. In this respect, Muslkrat would
indeed have gone very far toward permitting Congress to establish a specialized constitu-
tional court if it had upheld the statute, permitting four named Indians (and only them-
which feature alone might raise serious doubts about the adversary character of the litiga-
tion) to challenge the constitutionality of certain prior acts of Congress. While thee
plaintiffs happened to be affected in their private interests, their suit was not baqed upon
any alleged violation of their individual rights, it was based upon their authorization to
sue in order to determine the constitutionality of legislation which Congress considered
doubtful.
34. 50 STAT. 751 (1937).
35. This rule falls short of the Canadian practice, after which it seems to be patterned.
See, Grant, Judicial Review in Canada: Procedural Aspects, 42 CAN,. B. REv. 195, 214-22
(1964).
36. See Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
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An important, though perhaps not a necessary, consequence of these
ground rules is the fact that constitutional issues are determined within
a procedural framework which was designed for the adjudication of
ordinary lawsuits, and which severely restricts the Court's control over
the presentation of facts and issues. If litigation is conducted in the
form of an adversary contest, in which the initiative rests almost en-
tirely with the parties, and in which the Court is reduced to the role of
an impartial umpire, then one must of course also accept the con-
sequence that a litigant who fails to fight hard enough or well enough
should lose his case, even though from an objective point of view he
ought to have won. But this consequence, which otherwise may be
entirely acceptable for Anglo-American jurisprudence, 7 must surely
become highly problematical when a constitutional decision is at stake.
Even though constitutional questions are decided in ordinary lawsuits,
the litigants are in an important sense (which is only more obvious in
taxpayers' suits and competitors' or consumers' suits) representatives of
the public interest in constitutional government. 88 And the public in-
694 (1963); Karst, supra note 29, at 106. The major problem is, of course, that the factual
allegations in an amicus brief are not "evidence" and are not subjected to the rigorous
scrutiny of the adversary process. The same is true of the most celebrated technique for
bringing legislative facts to the Court's attention, the Brandeis brief; see Baade, supra
note 29, at 426-30; Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REv. 783 (1958); Freund, Review
of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREmE LAw 47 (Cahn ed.
1954); FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 86-92 (1949); Bikl6 Judicial
Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative
Action, 38 HARV. L. REv. 6 (1924). For the problems and implications of judicial notice,
see generally, Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 945 (1955).
37. As Professor Rheinstein has suggested, the procedural differences between the
Anglo-American and the Continental legal systems may be the expression of broader and
deeper differences in the underlying jurisprudential assumptions about the nature and
function of law. If it is true that Continental jurisprudence conceives of law as a rule
of conduct (addressed to the citizen), as "the order by which rights and duties are, at
least as a postulate, justly distributed among the members of the community," then It
would seem to follow that the role of the Courts in the process by which these rights are
protected and these duties are enforced should be more active and more Important than
it might be in a legal system which understands law primarily as a rule of decision,
coming into play only after the social processes for the settlement of disputes according
to community standards of "religion, ethics, convention and tradition" have failed:
Rheinstein, Book Review, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 318, 322-26 (1964).
For American appraisals of German civil procedure, emphasizing these differences In
the roles of the court, see: Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil
Procedure, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1443 (1958); Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on
the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 409 (1960).
88. See Judge Frank's theory of "private Attorney Generals" in Associated Indus. Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700-04 (1943). See generally, Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review
and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. Rxv. 345 (1956); Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HAsv. L. REv. 255 (1961). Professor Jaffe's
argument for severing the "public law function of the courts" from requirements whose
[V/ol. 75:517
THE POLITICAL QUESTION
terest in responsible and realistic constitutional decisions is much too
serious to be left unprotected against the accidents of ordinary liti-
gation.
If this protection cannot be afforded by an enlargement of the
Court's jurisdiction to permit the most competent parties to sue, or by
an enlargement of the Court's procedural powers to conduct an inde-
pendent investigation of facts and issues, then it seems reasonable to
expect that this protection will be provided by restrictive techniques
which will permit the Court to screen the cases in order to select those
which provide an adequate basis for the responsible performance of the
reviewing function. In order to qualify for the exercise of judicial re-
view, the factual situation of the case would have to illuminate in a
concrete fashion the practical implications of the constitutional issue,
and the litigants themselves would have to be vitally and antagonis-
tically interested, not only in the outcome of their lawsuit, but in the
determination of the constitutional issue as such. I submit that it is this
screening function which is being served by the Court's use of the non-
constitutional rules of standing, ripeness and adversariness.39
Of course, this formula does not yet explain the seeming inconsisten-
cies in the Court's use of these rules.40 But it suggests an approach to
this question which is different from the traditional analysis which
seems to measure consistency primarily by reference to the intensity of
the interest of the litigants in a decision of their case and therefore
takes the Court to task for avoiding real and present issues in cases of
concrete injuries while deciding hypothetical and abstract questions in
other cases where there is no such present injury.41 If these rules are
purpose it is to define "conventional litigation" and for replacing them with limitations
of judicial power in terms of the justiciability of the issues presented (id. at 302-05 and
passim) seems to go very far toward recognizing what I have called the "constitu-
tional court function." It may be asked, however, whether the dilution of the "concrete-
ness" and "adversariness" of the case, which might result from Professor Jaffe's recom-
mendations. would not endanger the reliability of constitutional judgments unless it were
accompanied by correlative adjustments of the procedural structure. But sec, Jaffe,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 495-500 (1965) where Professor Jaffe expreses
some doubts about the desirability of a "generally available public action in the federal
constitutional sphere." Id. at 495 (Emphasis in original.)
39. Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), has expressed some of there
considerations by the following formula:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.
369 U-S. at 204.
40. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
41. 'ce. e.g., 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw chs. 21, 22.
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understood as functional requisites for the responsible performance of
the constitutional-court function, then it seems entirely reasonable to
expect that the stringency of these requirements might vary consider-
ably with the character of the constitutional questions which are in
issue. The more abstract or absolute the constitutional standards, the
less will their application turn upon close and difficult questions of fact
and upon a weighing of competing values in the light of empirical
data, arid the less will the Court depend upon the suitability of the
case and upon the qualifications of the parties. 42
In Chicago & Grand Trunk R.R. v. Wellman,43 for instance, the
Court refused to decide a constitutional question upon an agreed state-
ment of facts in a "friendly" dispute. Measured by the same standards
of adversariness, the case for avoidance would have been even stronger
in Fletcher v. Peck.44 But in Fletcher, the Court was able to reach the
merits because it was ready to treat in an entirely abstract manner the
substantive question whether a state could, under the Contract Clause,
revoke its own grants, while the "reasonableness" of the rate regulation
challenged in Wellman would have depended entirely upon a close
42. It seems possible that the more important interrelationship between substantive
law and procedure might run the other way, and that the kind of substantive-law rules
which a court is likely to announce may be strongly influenced by the procedural frame-
work within which the judicial system is operating. More specifically, it seems not tnn-
reasonable to expect that a court might be more inclined to adopt "abstract" or "absolute"
criteria for defining the protection of important constitutional values if it cannot be sure
that its fact finding processes (or its own expertise) are reliable enough to permit a
realistic and responsible evaluation of the concrete balance of values in the individual
situation.
Questions of democratic responsibility aside, it seems to me fairly obvious that the
German Constitutional Court could (and should) never have adopted its "three-lcvel-test"
for the right to choose one's profession (See note 31 supra) if it had not been fully assured
that its own grasp of the economic and public health implications and of the possible
policy alternatives was at least equal to that of the legislature which had adopted tile
statute in question.
The dilemma of a court which would like to be both realistic in terms of the necessities
of national security and responsible in terms of the protection of important individual
rights, but whose grasp of the factual situation is not sure enough to support an inde-
pendent evaluation, has been stated most forcefully in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944). And is it altogether unreason-
able to suspect that an estimate of the effectiveness of the American judicial process in
applying (realistic, fact-oriented) "balancing tests" may also have something to do with
the adoption of an "absolutist position" on First Amendment rights by Justices Black
and Douglas? See also Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of
Rights, Harper's Magazine, February 1961, p. 63, in BLtCK, Tin; OccAsioNs oF JusTiEc
89 (1963); Mendelson, Book Review, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 583 (1961).
43. 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
44. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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scrutiny of the economics of railroad operation which the parties had
foreclosed by stipulating the profits of the railroad.
A functional approach might also help to explain Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.45 and United Public Workers v. Mitchell,46 two cases which
Professor Davis insists must be decided the other way before the law of
"ripeness" can begin to make sense.47 It is, of course, true that in the
Mitchell case (which was avoided) the provisions of the Hatch Act
limiting the freedom of federal employees to engage in political activi-
ties were in force when the suit was initiated, while in the Carter case
(which was decided on the merits) the wages and hours regulations
which were authorized by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act not
only had not yet been issued but were dependent upon an entirely un-
certain agreement by qualified majorities of both employers and em-
ployees. But, on the other hand, the Court may well have regarded the
constitutional balance between the political rights of civil servants and
the legitimate public interest in a neutral civil service as an extremely
close one, depending very much upon the actual scope of enforcement
and upon the concrete nature of the activities against which sanctions
were to be applied. In the Carter case, by contrast, the Court was will-
ing to strike down any federal regulation of wages and hours in an
industry which affected interstate commerce only "indirectly," a stan-
dard whose abstractness is best characterized by direct quotation:
Whether the effect of a given activity or condition [upon inter-
state commerce] is direct or indirect is not always easy to deter-
mine. The word "direct" implies that the activity or condition
invoked or blamed shall operate proximately-not mediately, re-
motely, or collaterally-to produce the effect. It connotes the
absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition. And the
extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its character.48
45. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
46. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
47. 3 DAvis, Aw.insTRqrvaTvE LAw § 21.10, at 200 (1958). The other six cases arc: Con-
necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 US. 541 (1948), and Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), (both of which the Court found ripe for adjudication); and
Public Utilities Commission v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953); Eccles v. Peoples
Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 273 US. 299
(1927); Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919) (all four of which
the Court refused to deide on their merits).
Of these, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Standard Scale, and Eccles seem to fit quite
well into the pattern which I have suggested. Connecticut Mutual does so also if one is
willing, as the majority did, to close one's eyes to the broader and more difficult problems
of interstate accommodation which were raised by the dissents. In the remaining two
cases, it is not dear how the Court would have defined the substantive-law criteria if it
had reached the merits.
48. 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1936).
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For a Court so emphatically determined to disregard all the complexi-
ties of the case and of the economic crisis that had led to the enactment
of the statute, there could surely be no reason for postponing the appli-
cation of its semantic abstractions in order to assure a fuller clarifica-
tion of facts and issues.
Finally, an almost perfect example for my thesis is Adler v. Board of
Education.49 A majority of the Court there upheld New York's Fein-
berg Law providing for the listing of subversive organizations by the
State Board of Regents and for the dismissal of all teachers in the public
school system who were members of such an organization and aware of
its subversive purpose. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in dissent,
the Mitchell rule should have applied a fortiori because no such listings
had yet been issued, and the complaining teachers had not even alleged
that the statute itself deterred them from any activities in which they
would otherwise have engaged. But Justice Minton, writing for the
majority, saw no such difficulties. For him, the statute was clearly con-
stitutional because it in no way deprived teachers of their freedoms of
speech and association-it merely put before them the choice of either
exercising these freedoms or continuing their employment in the public
school system which, after all, was not a right but merely a privilege.
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, also saw no reason to worry
about standing or ripeness. For them the statute was clearly unconsti-
tutional because it penalized teachers for the exercise of their "abso-
lute" freedoms of speech and association. The conclusion seems inevita-
ble that Justice Frankfurter alone advocated avoidance because he
alone defined the substantive issues in terms of a close balance between
the equally legitimate interests of society in its self-preservation and of
the teachers in their freedom of thought, inquiry and expression. Thus,
in order to strike this balance in the particular case, Frankfurter would
have had to know much more about the actual practices of enforcement
and the degree of surveillance to which the teachers would be subjected
than the bare text of an unenforced statute permitted him to know.50
It is my impression, in short, that much of the seeming inconsistency
in the law of standing, ripeness and adversariness would disappear
if the cases were analyzed in terms of the "legislative" or "consti-
tutional-court function" of the Supreme Court. Such an analysis
would have to begin with the examination of the constitutional issue
itself, as expressly or tacitly defined by the Court. One should then ask
whether the fact-situation of the case, the stage of its development and
49. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
50. Id. at 497-508.
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the qualifications of the parties in view of the availability of other
potential litigants and of the intensity of their interest in the issue
itself,51 were optimally or at least adequately suited for the full pre-
sentation and clarification, within the limitations of the adversary pro-
cess, of this particular constitutional question.
3. Avoidance and the Rule of Principle
Professor Bickel's justification for the "passive virtues," while per-
haps including the considerations outlined above, 2 goes much further,
permitting the Court to avoid a decision even in cases which do not
restrict its access to relevant information, but which, in the Court's
prudential judgment, would not permit a truly principled decision on
the merits.
For Professor Bickel, the only justification for judicial review in a
democratic polity is society's commitment to government under the rule
of principle, and the need for an institution capable of guarding, defin-
ing and developing society's enduring values with a view to the chang-
ing circumstances. 53 But judicial review remains a countermajoritar-
ian force whose impact upon the democratic political processes must
be strictly delimited by reference to its exceptional justification.
Whenever the Court invalidates a political decision as unconstitu-
tional, its judgment must be securely rooted in principle. But this must
also be so whenever the Court upholds a governmental measure as con-
stitutional. Drawing upon an analysis developed by Professor Charles
L. Black, Jr.,54 Bickel insists that a permissive decision on the merits
does not merely signify the absence of judicial intervention. In a society
which has come to rely upon the Court for the authoritative determina-
tion of issues of principle, such a decision may "legitimate" disputed
measures. It will engage the Court's institutional prestige against those
who have objected on grounds of principle; thus it may "generate con-
sent," and it may impart permanence to measures "that may have been
51. It seems to me that the "factors" which Professor Sedler (Sedler, supra note 20, at
627 and passim) has found affecting the "standing to assert constitutional jus tertii" could
well be employed for the functional analysis which I am suggesting in order to determine
whether there might be better parties for raising the particular issue and, if not, whether
the party before the Court is sufficiently interested in the constitutional issue itself to
assure its adequate presentation.
52. This seems to be suggested by Mr. Bickel's discussion of the interrelationship be-
tween "ripeness" and the substantive standards which the judge might have in mind,
BicuaL, THm LEAsr DAcmous BRarc 169-70 (1962).
53. Id. at 23-28.
54. BLACn, Trm PEOPLE AND Tm COURT 34-55 passim (1960). See also, Knctri.aEn,
PoLcrrxcAL Jus"icE 175-188 (1961).
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tentative . . or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execu-
tion. " 55 And, one might add, permissive decisions will shape and
channel the future course of political decision by providing certain
constitutional options in very much the same way in which negative
decisions do so by foreclosing others. Surely, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was as much influenced by some of the more permissive com-
merce-power cases as it was by The Civil Rights Cases."0
But if all constitutional decisions must be entirely principled, there
will be occasions, Professor Bickel maintains, where prudence will not
permit the Court to issue a principled judgment. Principle itself may
be in a process of evolution, and even where it has ripened society may
not yet be ready to accept it, or to accept it in its full measure, or as
applied to a particularly sensitive problem. Political society survives
and grows in the tension between principle and expediency, and even
though it may be firmly committed to the rule of principle, there must
be room for the temporary compromise and the "expedient muddling
through." A Court that would unconditionally enforce absolute prin-
ciple would destroy this dynamic balance. But at the same time, the
Court could not legitimate necessary but unprincipled political deci-
sions, or imperfect approximations of principle, without violating its
own "raison d'etre."
In the face of this dilemma, the Court should be able to escape from
the alternative between validation and invalidation; it should be able
to let the political decision stand for the time being, without having to
approve and to legitimate it. This is the purpose which is being served,
or which should be served, by the Court's use of its "almost inexhausti-
ble arsenal of techniques and devices" for avoiding a constitutional
judgment.57
Like the more limited explanation which I have suggested, Professor
Bickel's justification of the passive virtues is, at bottom, a functional
one. By avoiding the legitimation of imperfect compromise as well as
the untimely, and therefore self-defeating, enforcement of pure princi-
ple, the Court is paving the way for a more effective vindication of
principle under more auspicious circumstances. The passive virtues are
legitimate "because they make possible performance of the Court's
grand function as proclaimer and protector of the goals."58 While I am
persuaded of the validity of this theory of the Court's use of pro-
55. BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 129.
56. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
57. BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 52, at 70.
58. Id. at 71.
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cedural and jurisdictional techniques of avoidance, I disagree with Pro-
fessor Bickel's assumption that these same justifications will also
support the political question doctrine.
4. The Uniqueness of the Political Question
It is true, of course, that an application of the political question
doctrine is also a form of avoidance in the sense in which Professor
Bickel uses the term. When it defers without re-examination to the
position which the political departments have taken upon a question of
law, the Court explicitly refuses to assume any responsibility for the
lawfulness of this political position. It will let the political decision
stand, but it will not engage its own institutional prestige in support of
its legitimacy.59 Colegrove v. Green60 gave none of the aid and comfort
59. I should like to point out, however, that the line between "legitimation" in this
essentially political sense, and non-legitimation, is neither unchanging nor very dear, nor
does it necessarily coincide with the analytical distinction between a permissive decision
on the merits and a non-intervention on political question grounds. Whether a permis-
sive decision, upholding a challenged measure as "not unconstitutional," will be able to
generate much, or any, consent among the public, and, most importantly, among tlhose
who oppose the measure on grounds of principle, would seem to depend on two factors:
the opponents must be willing (as President Jackson, for instance, was not) to accept
the Court's decision as the authoritative determination of the constitutional issue; and
the opponents must be persuaded that the Constitution will provide standards which are
at least responsive to their principled objections. Where this is not so, the objectors
might see themselves impelled into civil disobedience against the constitutional order,
rather than into acceptance. See Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Dis-
obedience with American Institutions of Government, 43 TrExs L. REv. 492 (1965); Keeton,
The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TrxAs L. REv. 507 (1965).
Thus, the scope of the legitimating effect would seem to depend very much upon the
scope of constitutional law. Where the governmental measure is opposed on the ground
that it violates the proper allocation of powers and functions among the departments of
the federal government, or between the federal government and the states, it seems
obvious that the Constitution must have an answer to this dispute, and that a constitu-
tional decision (provided that the Court's authority is being accepted) will indeed settle
the issue. But is this equally true in all those cases where the objection is to the fairness
or to the substantive justice of a governmental measure? Will the long lines of cases
holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments will not stand in the way of tax
classifications challenged as discriminatory or destructive do much to persuade an oppo-
nent who is convinced that fairness and justice are essential to the legitimacy of all
governmental action? Will a conscientious objector change his mind if the Court tells
him that the Constitution does not protect his right of conscience? Or would the public
acceptance of Connecticut's anti birth control law have been helped much if, in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1956), Justice Black had been able to persuade a majority
that the right of privacy would not fit into any of the textual boxes, separated by ex-
panses of constitutional terra incognita, which for him seem to make up the substantive
content of the due process clause?
It seems to me that the "legitimating effect" will be weakened and may disappear
altogether in direct proportion to the importance of the objections which are treated as
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to the protagonists of malapportionment which Attorney General
Kennedy found in the permissive commerce-power cases when he had
to persuade a doubting House Judiciary Committee of the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Bill introduced in 1963.1
But if the political question is analytically a form of avoidance, its
effect is quite different from that of an avoidance on jurisdictional or
procedural grounds. A denial of certiorari will not affect the decision
below, and it will not stand in the way of the Supreme Court's later
determination of a case involving similar facts and issues. Lack of
"ripeness" will preclude a constitutional decision in the case, but the
same party may be able to obtain a decision once he has been affected
more concretely. If the avoidance is expressed in terms of "standing to
raise the issue" or "adversariness," the party before the Court will be
unable to raise the constitutional question, but the decision will, of
course, not bar "better" parties from eventually precipitating a deci-
sion of this question. In short, all these forms of avoidance affect the
individual case only, not the constitutional issue as such. Thus the
Court, in 1866, could hold unconstitutional trial of civilians by mili-
tary commission 62 even though it had avoided the same issue only two
years before.63 And the challengers of Connecticut's law against birth
irrelevant when the Court declares that it is concerned solely with the constitutionality,
and not with the desirability, the wisdom, or the justice, of a governmental measure.
In such situations, even the analytical line between a constitutional decision and a
political question decision may become blurred. For instance, in the decisions dealing
with the exclusion and explusion of aliens (see note 218 infra), it seems extremely difficult
to distinguish analytically between decisions on the merits, holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment does not provide for procedural safeguards when an alien is excluded and does
not limit the substantive grounds upon which an expulsion may be based, and political
question decisions, holding that the scope of Fifth Amendment protection In this field
must be determined by Congress, rather than by the courts.
Of course, all that follows from this discussion is that not all permissive decisions on
the merits will have much of a legitimating effect. Even though there may be a broad
spectrum of gradations between legitimation and non-legitimation, the political question
decision will invariably be found at its far end: it is not intended to, and It cannot,
legitimate a governmental measure that is challenged before the Court.
60. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). As Anthony Lewis has reported, the fact that the Illinois
Congressional districts were indeed reapportioned one year after Colegrove was attributed
to the fear that the Court might change its mind in the face of continuing state Inaction.
Thus, far from validating malapportionment, the decision seems to have had exactly the
opposite political effect. Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71
HARv. L. Ray. 1057, 1088 (1958).
61. See Excerpts from R. F. Kennedy's Statements on Civil Rights Bills, N.Y. Times,
June 27, 1963, p. 11, col. 2.
62. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See also the Court's handling of an
equally explosive issue in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
63. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). In view of Chief Justice
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control, after failing first on grounds of "standing,"04 and then of "ripe-
ness"65 were finally able to succeed when they appealed actual convic-
tion under the statute.60
The political question, by contrast, is not premised upon the specific
constellation of the individual case; it attaches to the issue itself.07 That
the Court is not merely interested in avoiding the individual case seems
to follow from the fact that some of the most important political ques-
tion cases reached the Court by way of certiorari.68 It is an indication of
this essential difference that the political question doctrine can be de-
scribed and discussed by reference to a limited number of fairly well-
defined questions of substantive law, 9 while procedural grounds for
avoidance do not fall into such patterns and can be employed with
respect to an unspecified variety of substantive issues. Once the political
question doctrine has been applied to a particular issue, the rules of
precedent and of stare decisis come into play and will prevent a judicial
Taney's experience in Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (CC Md. 1861). the avoidance
on procedural grounds in Vallandigham would seem to fit very well into Professor
Bickel's analysis.
64. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
65. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). But see Bicu., Tim LxAsT DA¢cEnous Bm,Ncni
143-56 (1962).
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 581 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. "The doctrine . . . is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political caes."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
68. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex tel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580 (1952); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 US. 160 (1948); Chicago &
So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 US.
50 (1945); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
69. In Baker v. Carr, supra note 67, at 211-26, Justice Brennan listed and discuse
the following categories: foreign relations, dates of duration of hostilities, validity of
enactments, the status of Indian tribes, republican form of government. More specificaliy,
the political question doctrine seems to have been limited to the following issues:
The validity of treaties under international and foreign constitutional law; the validity
of federal statutes under international law; the international boundaries of the United
States; the territorial sovereignty of foreign states; the existence of foreign insurgents,
belligerents, governments (de facto or de jure) and states; (perhaps) the effect which
American courts should accord to acts of foreign insurgents, belligerents, and govern-
ments; the immunity of foreign diplomats and of foreign state-owned or state-operated
vessels; (perhaps) the constitutionality of the exclusion and expulsion of aliens; the
legality of a license for air line service abroad; the duration of the civil war; the existence
of a state of facts justifying an exercise of the war power against alien enemies, and
(perhaps) against citizens suspected of participating in an insurrection; the necessity of
continuing federal protection of Indians in a process of assimilation; the recognition of
competing groups or persons as the lawful government or officers of a state; the validity
of state laws under the republican-form-of-government clause of the Constitution; the
validity of statutes allegedly enacted in violation of procedural requirements; the validity
of ratifications of a constitutional amendment; and, from Colegrove until Baker, the con-
stitutionality of apportionment statutes.
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determination of this issue in future cases. 70 If the validity of a govern-
mental measure was in issue, this measure has not only survived one
abortive challenge; henceforth both the government and the public
will be able to discount the probability of judicial interference with
measures of this kind. When using the procedural techniques of absten-
tion, the Court still retains its ultimate responsibility for defining and
enforcing the constitutional principle which is at stake; it remains the
"protector and proclaimer of the goals." But when it holds that a ques-
tion is "political" rather than "judicial," the Court renounces this
responsibility altogether, and leaves the performance of this function
to the political institutions. Such an abstention cannot be justified
instrumentally; its purpose is not to prepare the ground for a more
responsible, or more effective vindication of principle under more
auspicious circumstances. When it applies the doctrine to a question,
the Court abdicates its responsibility "to say what the law is."
This form of abstention not only raises difficulties for the classical
theory, but also is not easily reconciled with Professor Bickel's theory
of judicial review. The doctrine seems to have wider and more dis-
turbing implications than any of the procedural or jurisdictional tech-
niques of avoidance, and the question of its function and legitimacy
would seem to require further investigation even if one accepts Pro-
fessor Bickel's rationale of the passive virtues in all other respects.
III. THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
The classical theory attempts to eliminate the difficulties suggested
above by insisting that the political question doctrine is itself a prod-
uct of constitutional interpretation, rather than of judicial discretion.
And in Baker v. Carr, the Court's most thorough re-examination of
the political question doctrine, Justice Brennan, speaking for the ma-
jority,71 as well as Justice Douglas, have maintained that the political
question doctrine should be understood as a function of the federal
separation of power. In the words of Justice Douglas: "Where the
Constitution assigns a particular function wholly and indivisibly to
another department, the federal judiciary does not intervene."72
Even if it were true, as it is not,78 that the doctrine applies only where
70. Of course, the Court may overrule or distinguish a political question decision, but
it seems to do so no more readily or easily than with respect to cases decided on their
merits.
71. 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
72. Id. at 246.
73. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), where, in an opinion written by
Justice Holmes, the Court accepted as conclusive the determination by the Governor of
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a decision by one of the co-ordinate branches of the federal government
is actually or potentially in issue, the proponents of this theory would
have the burden of showing why some, but not all, constitutional
grants of power to Congress and to the President should be interpreted
as precluding judicial review. And they would further have to demon-
strate that the Court's actual practice of decision does indeed conform
to any such pattern.
Professor Wechsler alone appears to have dealt specifically with the
first of these tasks. He takes as his point of departure the constitutional
provisions for impeachment by the House and trial of impeachment by
the Senate,74 and the provisions that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members" 75 and
that "Each House may... punish its Members for disorderly Behavior,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."'" But
even if it is true that Congressional decisions under these heads of
power are not reviewable by the courts, 77 it seems doubtful whether
the rationale behind this conclusion also supports, as Wechsler sug-
gests, the political question doctrine in other areas, such as conformity
of state law to the standards of the guarantee clause and legislative
districting.
I am rather hesitant to accept this suggestion. It seems to me that the
examples upon which it relies are unique in that these grants of power
all concern functions that are essentially adjudicative. The trial of
impeachment, and the decision whether a member of Congress was
Colorado that a state of insurrection had existed which had justified the incarceration
without trial of labor leaders who were suspected of contributing to the unrest. See also.
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Sterling v. Constantin.
287 U.S. 378 (1932), where the Court, while reviewing the necessity of state emergency
measures, seemed to assume that the scope of its reviewing power vis.a-vis state measures
was governed by the same principles as its review of federal emergency action.
See further Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649
(1894) and Clough v. Curtis, 134 U.S. 361 (1890). in which the political question doctrine
was applied in cases challenging the regularity of enactments of territorial legislatures.
The Court, as a matter of course, assumed that its review of territorial enactments was
limited by the same considerations which applied to its review of federal legislation: see
note 106 infra.
74. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 "The House of Representatives. . . shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, ci. 6: "The Senate shall have the sole
Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of tvo thirds of
the Members present."
75. US. Coxsr. art. I, § 5 c. 1.
76. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 5 cl. 2.
77. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAnv. L R'. 1,
12 (1959).
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
validly elected, or whether he should be punished or expelled for mis-
conduct, all seem to involve the determination of a concrete dispute in
the light of pre-existing constitutional, statutory or conventional stan-
dards. They concern disputes which might well be regarded as "cases
and controversies" in the sense of Article III of the Constitution, and
which under some constitutions are, indeed, decided by the judiciary78
It may therefore be reasonable to construe the express constitutional
authorization of Congress to decide these disputes as an equally ex-
plicit exception to the general grant of judicial power to the courts in
Article III. But this rationale is unavailable, even as the basis of a valid
analogy, where the Court, as is normal in political question cases, is
presented with a challenge to the validity of a legislative or executive
decision of one of the co-ordinate branches of the federal government.
Thus there seems to exist, in spite of Professor Wechsler's effort, con-
siderable obscurity about the nature of the constitutional analysis
which would require the Court to regard some legislative and execu-
tive powers as committed "wholly and indivisibly to another depart-
ment," while the Congressional and Presidential decisions under other
(equally explicit) constitutional heads of power should remain review-
able.
Assuming that the classical theory could establish a canon of inter-
pretation, it would still have to show that any such interpretation
78. See, e.g., the following provisions of the West German Grundgesetz:
Art. 41(1) The scrutiny of elections is the responsibility of the Bundestag. It also
decides whether a deputy has lost his seat in the Bundestag.
(2) Against the decision of the Bundestag an appeal can be made to the Federal
Constitutional Court.
Art. 61(1) The Bundestag or the Bundesrat may impeach the Federal President before
the Federal Constitutional Court for willful violation of the Basic Law or any other
Federal law. The motion for impeachment must be brought forward by at least
one-fourth of the members of the Bundestag or one-fourth of the votes of the
Bundesrat. The decision to impeach requires a majority of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the Bundestag or of two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. The prosecution
is conducted by a person commissioned by the impeaching body.
(2) If the Federal Constitutional Court finds the Federal President guilty of a
willful violation of the Basic Law or of another Federal law, it may declare him
to have forfeited his office. After impeachment, it may issue an interim order
preventing the Federal President from exercising the powers of his office.
Art. 98(l)...
(2) If a Federal judge, in his official capacity or unofficially, infringes upon the
principles of the Basic Law or the constitutional order of a Land, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court may decide by a two-thirds majority, upon the request of the
Bundestag, that the judge be transferred to another office or placed on the retired
list. In a case of an intentional infringement, his dismissal may be ordered. (Cited
in ANDREWS, CoNSrrrunONS AND CONsTrruTioALusm 100 ff (2d ed. 1963)).
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could consistently explain the Court's actual practice. This attempt
has not been undertaken since 1925, when, in an extensive discussion
of the cases, Mr. Weston tried to show that in every instance "the line
between judicial and political questions .... is the line drawn by the
constitutional delegation, and none other."7 19 Unfortunately, it is quite
difficult to verify or controvert this thesis by a mere textual analysis
of political question decisions. There is usually no doubt in political
question cases (and if there were doubt, the doctrine would not apply)
that the President or Congress has the constitutional power to act in
this particular field, and it is therefore almost inevitable that the
Court will refer to this "textually demonstrable" (express or implied)
constitutional grant of power in its opinion. The question before the
Court is whether, granted the power to act, the action of the President
or of Congress is lawful under international or constitutional law; and
the Court's answer, in a political question decision, is that it will not
review measures of this particular kind. Whether this disposition is
based upon an interpretation of the Constitution cannot, of course,
be determined merely by searching for references to a constitutional
grant of power in the opinion. In order to answer this question it be-
comes necessary to take a broader look at the Court's practice in one
particular field, and to determine whether the overall pattern of politi-
cal question cases and cases decided on their merits could be explained
in terms of any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution.
In view of the "absolutist" claims of the classical theory it seems
sufficient to test its validity in one particularly important area. A fair
test would seem to be the field of the foreign relations power, which
gave rise to a great number of political question decisions 0 for which
Mr. Weston has offered the following explanation:
The rule whereby the courts accept as their guide the decisions of
the other two departments upon questions involving international
relations is fairly well settled.8'
These cases and similar ones require for their support two circum-
stances only: first, that the entire active conduct of foreign affairs
shall have been entrusted to the executive, and to some degree to
the legislative, departments; and, second, that the imperative need
of unity at home for dealing abroad shall be recognized. The first
is found in the Constitution .... s 2
79. Weston, Political Questions, 38 H v. L. REv. 296, 331 (1925).
80. See generally JAFFE, JuDicIAL AsPEcs OF FoREGN RELATIoNs (1933); Diddnson, The
Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451 (1956).
81. Weston, supra note 79, at 315-16.
82. Id. at 318-19.
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Even more explicit is the footnote which Weston inserted at this point:
It is hardly necessary to quote the relevant provisions of the Con-
stitution to this point, nor to discuss the division as between the
two departments. It is sufficient that they divide the power of ad-
ministering foreign affairs, to the complete exclusion of the judi-
ciary.83
If this were also the Court's view of the constitutional division of func-
tions, there should have been no decisions on the merits at all in this
broad area. The cases show that this is not so.
First, it should be pointed out that with the exception of a few cases
dealing with the exclusion and expulsion of aliens 4 and, arguably, of
United States v. Pink, 5 the Court has consistently decided on their
merits all constitutional issues arising out of cases involving the foreign
relations power. The constitutional scope of the treaty power vis-A-vis
the states 0 and vis-4-vis individual rights,87 and the allocation of com-
petence in this field among the executive and legislative departments,8
were never held to present non-justiciable questions. And although
issues concerning the international boundaries of the United States
were usually regarded as political, 9 the corresponding issues of whether
83. Id. at 319, n.89. (Emphasis added.)
84. Exclusion: The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezcl,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Deportation: Fong Yue Tmg v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
85. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). It seems possible to read the Pink case as holding that the
President's "policy of recognition," as expressed in the Litvinov Assignment, was also
determinative of the question whether the Assignment, as applied, violated the Fifth
Amendment. Contra, McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executlve or Presi.
dential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (1945) in McDOUAL
& AssocirAs, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 404, 572 n.38 (1960), who argue that the
Pink case should be read as holding that, under the facts of the case, the Fifth Amend-
ment did not preclude the Federal Government from giving itself priority over foreign
creditors. But see United States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946);
Steingnt v. Guaranty Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), afJ'd, 161 F.2d 571 (2d
Cir. 1947), where the courts, citing Pink, applied the Assignment against American
creditors as well.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1796).
87. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
88. See generally McDougal & Lans, supra note 85. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W.
Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), afj'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955);
United States v. Belmont, supra note 86; B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583
(1912).
89. See Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892);
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territories concededly under the sovereignty of the United States were
to be treated as part of the United States for purposes of applying the
Constitution or federal statutes,90 or whether activities outside the
United States should nevertheless come within the territorial scope of a
federal statute,91 were consistently (though not without opposition)
decided by the Court.
But even if, in fairness to Mr. Weston, one accepted a qualification
suggested by him and excluded "points of constitutional law"0 12 from
the scope of this inquiry, there would remain numerous decisions
which seem incompatible with his theory that the courts should, by
force of the Constitution, be prevented from deciding issues that have a
bearing upon the external relations of the United States. While the
courts will not question the correctness, under international law, of the
President's recognition of foreign insurgents, belligerents, govern-
ments, states or state boundaries, the correlative rule that any foreign
group exercising effective power which is not officially recognized by
the United States must be treated as non-existent by American courts 3
has suffered numerous exceptions in cases where the courts took judi-
cial notice of the existence of a de facto government, or where they
found evidence for this existence in official pronouncements which had
been carefully worded to exclude any implication of an official diplo-
Jones v. United States, 137 US. 202 (1890); United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127
(1850); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253 (1829).
90. See Balcac v. Puerto Rico, 258 US. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 US. 244
(1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 US. 1 (1901); Cross v. Harrison, 57 US. (16 How.) 164
(1853); Fleming v. Page, 50 US. (9 How.) 602 (1850).
91. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 US. 281 (1949); Vcrmilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 US. 377 (1948). See also, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US.
554 (1959).
92. "With regard to the "political decisions" which the Court will accept in the field
of foreign relations, Mr. Weston adds: "It is to be noted also that these determinations
are largely issues of fact, and not often decisions on points of constitutional law."
Weston, supra note 79, at 319. But it should also be noted that the distinction between
"fact" and "law" is misleading and might profitably be replaced by a distinction between
issues of domestic (constitutional, statutory, and judge-made) and international and
foreign law. For instance, in Foster v. Neilson, supra note 89, one of the cases which
Weston discussed, the only point in issue was the interpretation of the Louisiana Purchase
treaty which, of course, was purely a question of law.
93. See, e.g., Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 225,
262-63, 139 N.E. 259, 262 (1923); The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1920). See
also, Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 US. (13 Pet.) 414, 420 (1839); United States v.
Klintock, 18 US. (5 Wheat.) 144, 150 (1820); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 US. (3 Wheat.) 246,
323 (1818); Rose v. Himely, 8 US. (4 Cranch) 241, 271 (1803).
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matic "recognition."94 Furthermore, and more important, the courts
have usually (at least until Justice Sutherland dealt with the "Litvinov
Assignment"9 5 ) decided for themselves what effect, if any, should be
94. See, e.g., United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); The Ambrose
Light, 25 Fed. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N.E. 679 (1933); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924);
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
95. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Court had decided that an officer
of a foreign revolutionary government was not personally liable for damages arising out
of military measures in the course of a civil war. The subsequent diplomatic recognition
by the United States of the revolutionary government was treated as evidence of the
"governmental" or "military" (rather than "private') character of its prior acts, bringing
into play the act of state doctrine. The same rule was applied in Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), but was misleadingly restated in the following passage:
It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the principles of inter-
national law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt is
recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure government
of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect
and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from
the commencement of its existence.
Id. at 302-03. This relatively harmless misstatement of the Hernandez rule was seized
upon by Justice Sutherland in the Belmont case in order to establish the novel theory
that the American recognition of the Soviet government also had the effect of immunizing
Soviet confiscations against objections based upon the public policy of the forum. Moore,
The New Isolation, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 618 (1933); Borchard, Editorial Comment:
Extraterritorial Confiscations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 279-80 (1942).
The Court's position may well be explained as the result of a political practice of
withholding diplomatic recognition from governments whose effective power Is well es-
tablished. If recognition has been denied because of the illegitimacy of a foreign govern-
ment, or because of a moral disapproval of its acts, then it becomes indeed possible for
the courts to find in the subsequent act of recognition an implicit official declaration
that the past conduct of this government should no longer be regarded as violating
American standards of public policy. This interrelationship seems to be most obvious in
the British decision A. M. Luther Co. v. James Sagor & Co., 3 K.B. 532 (1921), which was
cited in the Belmont opinion.
While the Court, in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), professed to follow the
new Belmont rule, it seems possible to read the opinion somewhat more narrowly as
holding that the "policy of recognition" with regard to the settlement of Russian debts
was determined by the President in the exercise of his power to establish diplomatic
relations, and that therefore the Litvinov Assignment should be read as embodying a
specific federal policy, overriding other public-policy exceptions. See, Note, United States
v. Pink-A Reappraisal, 48 COLUM. L. Rxv. 890, 895-96 (1948). It should be noted, how-
ever, that some lower federal courts have subsequently treated a "policy of non-recogni-
tion" as equally conclusive: See, e.g., The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3rd Cir. 1944) and
cases cited in Briggs, Non-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic Republics,
37 Am. J. INT'L L. 585 (1943).
Of course, the "Bernstein exception" to the act-of-state rule has opened another avenue
for the executive department to determine the effect which American courts should give
to foreign governmental action. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandshe-Amerikaansche Stoom-
vaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
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accorded the acts of foreign powers, recognized or unrecognized.,,
Turning to the constitutional grant of the treaty power, in regard to
which the textual argument for "the complete exclusion of the judi-
ciary" would seem to be strongest, the Court has indeed treated as
"political" the questions whether the foreign partner to a treaty had
constitutional authority to assume a particular obligation, 7 and
whether a treaty, or a treaty provision, has become ineffective because
of the partner state's loss of independence 8 or because of changes in
the territorial sovereignty of the partner state.00 But at the same time,
the Court itself decided that under international law the violation of
a treaty by the partner state will not ipso facto render the treaty inef-
fective, 100 and, what is more important, the Court decided on the merits
But cf. the discussion of this exception in Banco Naional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 419-20, 428 (1964).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 153 (1850); Garcia v. Lee,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 521 (1838); Keene v. McDonough, 33 US. (8 Pet.) 308 (1834). The
rule which seems to emerge from these cases is that the acts of an unrecognized de facto
government may be treated as valid as long as they do not violate the rights which are
based upon the de jure situation. This would also seem to explain the result in Williams
v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839), which was criticized by Professor Dickinson
for its disregard of the "relevance of a de facto situation." Dickinson, supra note 80, at
456.
97. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853). This opinion dearly does not rest
upon the constitutional ground that the provisions of a self-executing treaty ratified by
the Senate are the law of the land, regardless of whether the international treaty iWtelf
was validly concluded. This theory, however, seems to have been adopted with regard to
treaties concluded with Indian tribes: United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 200.02
(1926); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1857).
98. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902). The Court assumed, with regard to an
extradition treaty concluded with Prussia before the establishment of the German
Empire, that the "loss of separate existence" of Prussia would have terminated the
American obligations under the treaty. Only after a lengthy discussion of the constitu-
tional law of Germany which tended to support the position taken by the State Depart-
ment, did the Court finally accede to the "controlling" political determination that
Prussia still existed and that the treaty was still in force. See also Clark v. Allen, 331 US.
503, 514 (1947).
99. Kennett v. Chambers, 55 US. (14 How.) 38 (1852).
100. See Justice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 US. (3 Dall.) 199, 260.61
(1796); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
These cases are usually cited as political question decisions: JAFFE, JLTIZcIAL AsPvcrs OF
FoREIGN RELATIONS 77 n-.207 (1933); Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law:
"Political Questions", 104 U. PA. L. REv. 451, 486-87 (1956). This seems incorrect. In both
cases, the Court dealt with the claim that, as a matter of international law, treaty pro-
visions had become inoperative because the partner state had failed to fulfill its own
obligations. The Court rejected this theory, holding that, under international law, non-
fulfllment by one party might entitle the partner state to seek compensation or, perhaps,
to renounce its own obligations, but that, as long as the United States had not chosen
to exercise any of these rights, the treaty remained in force. The language reminiscent of
the political question occurs in passages which explain the obvious proposition that it is
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and without reference to the political departments, that some treaties
and treaty provisions, but not others, will survive a state of war between
the United States and its treaty partner.101 Whatever may explain these
differing results, I fail to see how such an explanation could be re-
duced to any internally consistent interpretation of the constitutional
grant of the treaty power. And if the "entire active conduct of foreign
affairs" were entrusted exclusively to the political departments, it
would be equally difficult to explain the numerous instances in which
the courts have interpreted international agreements without reference
to, and sometimes in direct conflict with, the interpretation adopted
by the executive department. 102
Similar vacillations between political question cases and cases de-
cided on their merits, which cannot readily be explained in terms of
"the constitutional delegation," appear in the decisions dealing with
for the political departments, rather than for the courts, to exercise, or not to exercise,
the options which international law (as interpreted by the Court) offers to the United
States.
101. Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 281 (1929); Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). See also
The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128
N.E. 185 (1920). But see Clark v. Allen, supra note 98, at 508-09 where Justice Douglas
would have been willing to declare a treaty terminated by war if the Executive or
Congress had "formulated a national policy quite inconsistent with the enforcement of a
treaty in whole or in part." Of course, Congress can always derogate a valid treaty by
passing a statute which is in conflict with it. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889). Therefore, Justice Douglas' reference to an inconsistent Congressional policy should
probably be read as an indication that in such a situation the Court will not attempt to
construe the later statute so as to avoid a conflict with American international obligations,
which would otherwise be the rule. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 549
(1895); United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883); The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804).
102. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407 (1886); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83 (1867); United States v. Arredondo, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832); Tartar Chemical Co. v. United States, 116 Fed. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1902),
re'd, 127 Fed. 944 (2d Cir. 1903) (after the State Department had succeeded in concluding
an amendment to the agreement in question which expressly sustained the Department's
prior interpretation); United States v. Watts, 14 Fed. 130 (D.Cal. 1882).
On the whole, the Supreme Court's practice of treaty interpretation appears to be
much more flexible than a rigorous constitutional doctrine would permit. It ranges from
Foster v. Neilson, supra note 89, where the issue of treaty interpretation, coinciding
with territorial claims asserted by both Congress and the President, was treated as an
outright political question, through numerous cases asserting that an interpretation by
the political departments, while not conclusive, should be given much weight, to Perkins
v. Elg, supra, where the Court rejected, in an internationally not very important case,
a treaty interpretation by the State Department which would have resulted in the (consti.
tutionally doubtful) involuntary expatriation of an American citizen. It seems that the
Court is paying much more attention to the political and legal implications of the
concrete case than to the logic of any theory which might be derived from the consti-
tutional grant of the treaty power.
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exercises of the war power,103 with the guarantee clause,E4 with the
process of constitutional amendment 05 and with the process of legisla-
tive enactment.1 06
If the Court could decide on the merits cases which according to the
103. Compare, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 US. 51 (1923) with Woods v.
Miller, 333 US. 138 (1948); and Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). Compare
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 US. 160 (1948) with Lee v. Madigan, 358 US. 228 (1959). Compare
Martin v. Mott, 25 US. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) with Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 US. (13 How.)
115 (1851).
104. Compare Luther v. Borden, 48 US. (7 How.) 1 (1849) with Texas v. White. 74
U.S. (7 Wall) 700 (1869). Compare Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrry, 199 US. 233
(1905); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 US. 506 (1897); In re Duncan, 139 US. 449 (1891); and
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 WalL) 162 (1875) with Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnmv,
300 U.S. 608 (1937); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 US. 370 (1930); Ohio ex
rel. Bryant v. Akron Park Dist., 281 US. 74 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 US. 219 (1917); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 US. 565 (1916); O'Neill v.
Learner, 239 US. 244 (1915); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 US. 151 (1912); and Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 US. 118 (1912). See generally Bonfield, The Guaranty
Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MiNN. L Rm.
513 (1962).
105. Compare United States v. Sprague, 282 US. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 US.
130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Hawke v. Smith, 253 US. 221 (1920); Na-
tional Prohibition Cases, 253 US. 350 (1920); and Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 US. (3
Dall.) 378 (1798), with Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See generally O-ulaw, Tim
AMENDIrN oF THE FEDRL CoNSn-rnON (1942).
106. Compare Gardner v. The Collector, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868) with Harwood v.
Wentworth, 162 US. 547 (1896); and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
See also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 US. 276 (1919); Rainey v. United States, 232
U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 US. 107 (1911); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,
167 US. 196 (1897); Lyons v. Woods, 153 US. 649 (1894); United States v. Ballm, 144 US.
1 (1892). It is important to note that in all these cases the Supreme Court did assume the
task of constitutional interpretation (a statute becomes law only if it conforms fully to the
text which was voted upon in Congress; a quorum is reached if a majority of the
members is present, even if not all of them will vote; a two-thirds majority requires the
assent of two thirds of the members voting, not of two thirds of all members; a regulatory
tax is not a "bill for raising revenue" which must be introduced in the House; Senate
amendments to revenue bills are permissible only if they are "germane" to the subject
matter of the House bill). The "political question" in these cases was limited to the issue
of whether these standards, as laid down Jy the Court, had in fact been met by Congress.
Field v. Clark, supra, Harwood v. Wentworth, supra, (conformity of the published text
to the text voted upon) and, perhaps, Rainey v. United States, supra, ("germaneness" of
a Senate amendment) are the only cases where the result was squarely based on the theory
that the Court could not go behind a duly promulgated statute to determine for itself
whether it had been properly enacted. In all other cases, the Court did in fact ("for the
sake of argument') look at the journals and other evidence to show that even if the
political question doctrine would not apply the challenge would be unsuccessful on the
merits. In the Pocket Veto Case, 279 US. 655 (1929), there was, of course, no room for the
political question doctrine. To whom should the Court have deferred: to Congress which
thought that the bill had become law, or to the President who insisted that it had been
vetoed by virtue of his inaction? See also Wright v. United States, 302 US. 583 (1938);
Edwards v. United States, 286 US. 482 (1932); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
175 US. 423 (1899).
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
classical theory it should be constitutionally unable to decide, then
the theory cannot be accepted as a sufficient explanation even of those
cases which might seem to conform to the postulated rule. It is true
that the Court time and again refers to the constitutional delegation
of power to the political departments in its political question decisions,
and it would be a mistake to discount the relevance of such pronounce-
ments. Once they have been formulated, they acquire a weight of their
own, and they may then prevent the Court's intervention even in situa-
tions where there may be no otherwise compelling reasons for such
deference to a political decision. 107 However, it is not enough to show
that the Court sometimes couches its results in terms of constitutional
interpretation. The "classicists" attempt to account for and, in Pro-
fessor Bickel's accurate phrase, to domesticate, the doctrine fails on two
counts: they have been unable to develop a canon of interpretation
which would relate the various clusters of political question cases to
the Constitution; and it seems that within these clusters the Court's
actual practice of decision will not fall into patterns which would fit
any reasonable interpretation of the specific constitutional grants of
power which are involved.
IV. THE PRUDENTIAL THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
The critics of the classical theory not only challenge the logical
syllogisms of Marbury v. Madison and the notion of a constitutional
duty of the Court to exercise its reviewing power in all cases and con-
troversies, they also deny the constitutional quality of the political
question doctrine. In their view, the doctrine is "something greatly
more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not prin-
ciple."' 08 Writing in 1924, Mr. Finkelstein described these prudential
factors in the following passage:
There are certain cases which are completely without the sphere
of judicial interference. They are called, for historical reasons,
"political questions." [The term] applies to all those matters of
which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is
impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea
of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the
consequences that a decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes
it will result from the feeling that the court is incompetent to deal
with the particular type of question involved. Sometimes it will
107. The independent weight of past pronouncements which may preclude a re-
examination of the underlying factors is shown most clearly by Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). See supra note 84.
108. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, 125-26 (1962).
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be induced by the feeling that the matter is "too high" for the
courts. But always there will be a weighing of considerations in
the scale of political wisdom.1°9
1. An "Opportunistic" Theory of the Political Question?
There are some indications that Mr. Finkelstein was ready to ex-
plain the doctrine primarily in terms of the Court's instincts for politi-
cal survival, instincts which would persuade it to avoid the decision
of "prickly issues" and "contentious questions" touching the "hyper-
sensitive nerve of public opinion."'10
If the opportunistic theory should be premised upon the Court's
apprehensions about the effectiveness of its disposition of a particular
case, it seems unpersuasive. Whenever the doctrine was applied in a
lawsuit between private parties, as it was in some of the most seminal
109. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HA.v. L. REv. 338, 3414-45 (192-).
110. Id. at 339, 363.
Professor Philippa Strum has recently undertaken a somewhat similar analysis of the
doctrine in terms of what she calls the "enforcement problem." The following passage
appears to be a fair summary of this more sophisticated variation of the "opportunistic"
theory:
All Court decisions are political in their effects, and yet not all of them are
labelled political questions. They all affect the distribution of power-political,
economic, social-but in most cases popular opinion is already agreed or is willing
to agree that a particular power configuration is beneficial to society. The political
question appears before that agreement has had a chance to come into existence; and
until such a consensus is reached, it would be insufferable for the judiciary to force
one. Here, then, is the justification par excellence for the political question: it
can frequently enable the Court to restrain itself from precipitating impossible
situations which might otherwise rip the always delicate social fabric. No rules are
forced upon a country not yet ready for them; on the contrary, the country at large
is permitted to work out its own rules, which can then be translated into law through
judicial fiat. The self-restraint exercised by the Court is more than a self-saving
mechanism; it is also the affirmation of a government which finds the source of its
actions in popular desires.
STRum, Tnm SUPREME COURT AND TIM "PoLrricAL QuEsrnoN" 235, Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The New School for Political and Social Science, 1964. However persuasive as
a prescription, this theory--apparently patterned after the evolution of reapportionment
decisions-does not seem to describe very accurately the Court's actual political question
practice. Apart, perhaps, from some language in the Sabbatino case regarding the act of
state doctrine and, arguably, some exclusion and deportation cases, the theory seems to
have no relevance at all for the political question decisions in the area of foreign relations
(with which this dissertation, however, was not concerned). But I also fail to see in what
way the Court would have preempted the field of an emergent popular consensus in its
decisions dealing with the duration of war, the status of Indians, legislative procedure,
and the procedure for ratifying constitutional amendments. Miss Strum, therefore, prefers
to explain most of the cases which she discusses by a "hot potato" theory which appears
to be quite similar to Finkelstein's.
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political question decisions,"1 ' there was no doubt that the litigants
would have obeyed a decision on the merits. And the same obedi-
ence might have been expected in the majority of cases in which a
decision on the merits could have gone against a state or the federal
government.
It is true that there have been a number of instances in which the
Court did reach, or even overstep, the limits of its effective power. It
may have done so in its encounters with the conflict between the
Cherokees and Georgia, with Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Ha.
beas Corpus during the Civil War or with racial segregation. But in
Worcester v. Georgia"2 Chief Justice Marshall did finally decide
against Georgia in spite of the high probability that his order would
be disregarded;"13 in Ex parte Merryman,"14 Chief Justice Taney had
even gone out of his way to provoke the conflict with the President;"56
and in its integration decisions the present Court has time and again
put its authority on the line to enforce its understanding of the consti-
tutional commands.
I am not suggesting, of course, that the Court will never choose to
avoid a fight; but it seems that as a rule it will not employ the heavy
artillery of the political question doctrine to cover its retreat from
trouble in an individual case. Its avenue of escape may be chosen as
ingeniously as in Marbury v. Madison or as disingenuously as some
commentators claim it was in Ex parte Vallandigham"° and in Naim
111. E.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 US. 297 (1918); Luther v. Borden, 48 US.
(7 How.) 1 (1849); Foster v. Neilson, 27 US. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
112. 31 US. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
113. At the time of decision, compliance with the Court's reversal of these convictions
of missionaries working in the Cherokee territories without having taken the oath of
allegiance required by Georgia's annexation statutes, seemed no more likely than It had
been in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In both cases, the Georgia
legislature had in advance enjoined state officers from carrying out any orders of the
Supreme Court, and in view of President Jackson's well known sympathy for Georgia's
Indian policy, federal enforcement could not be expected. That Georgia was finally willing
to compromise, and to release the defendants, was due to a surprising change of Jackson's
policy. See COMMAGER, DocuMEN's Or AMERICAN HsTroRY, Does. 142-46 (5th ed. 1949);
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 325-32 (rev. ed. 1959); 1 HAINES,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLrrics 553 (1944); 1
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 753, 776 (rev. ed. 1932).
114. 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C. Md. 1861).
115. See RossrrER, THE SUPRE IE COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 20-26, esp. 21
(1951).
116. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1863). Vallandigham, a resident of Ohio, had been tried
before a military commission established under authority of the President and had been
convicted on a charge of having expressed sympathies for the rebel cause. His application
for writ of certiorari challenging the jurisdiction of the military commission over civilians
was denied by the Supreme Court on the ground that the commission was not a "court"
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v. Naim,"17 or the Court may simply avail itself of its opportunities
for procrastination,"18 exercise its discretion to grant or withhold relief
in equity cases," 9 or use its procedural and jurisdictional'2 ° techniques
of avoidance. Apart, perhaps, from Colegrove v. Green'2 ' and its pro-
geny and from two Reconstruction cases, -' 2 the political question doc-
trine does not seem to have been applied in situations in which the
Court's disposition of the case was likely to be disobeyed.
whose proceedings could be reviewed by certiorari. See Professor Rositer's comments
upon this avoidance of the issues presented in the case, op. cit. supra note 115, at 29, 32,
37.
117. In Ham Say Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.F.2d 749 (1955), the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the annulment of a marriage between a Chinese man and
a white woman, rejecting on the merits a challenge to the constitutionality of Virginia's
anti-miscegenation aw. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case in
a per curiam opinion, on the basis of the "inadequacy of the record as to the relation-ship
of the parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North
Carolina and upon their return to Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring here
all questions relevant to the disposition of the case ...." 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
On remand, the Virginia court explained that the record before the state courts had
been adequate for the decision of the issues presented to them and that there as,
therefore, no procedural ground for re-opening the case in order to gather additional
evidence and to render a new decision. It repeated that the material facts had not been in
dispute, that the parties had left Virginia to be married in North Carolina and had
immediately returned to Virginia and lived there as husband and wife, and that at the
time of commencement of the suit the wife had been a bona-fide resident of Virginia,
while defendant husband was no longer a resident of the state. 197 Va. 734. 90 S.E. 849
(1956). Thereupon the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
Virginia decision "leaves the case without a properly presented federal question." 350 U.S.
985 (1956). Professor Wechsler has found this disposition "wholly without basis in the
law." IVWcHSLER, PRINCpLES, POLmCS AND FUNDAMENTAL IAw 47 (1961). But see, BicEL,
op. cit. supra note 108, at 71, 126.
118. See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Miss Endo had been interned in May
1942 and, though she had successfully passed a loyalty examination, had not been able
to leave the internment camp. Her petition of habeas corpus had been filed in July 1942;
it was finally successful in the Supreme Court in December 1944. See also Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), where convictions of civilians by military commissions
in Hawaii which had occurred in August 1942 and March 1944 were overturned by the
Supreme Court in February 1946.
119. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 US. 475 (1903) and Justice Rutledge's position
in MacDougall v. Green, 535 US. 281, 284-87 (1948) and in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 564-66 (1946).
120. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra note 113, where the Court managed
to avoid the more unmanageable challenge to Georgia's Indian policy on the ground that
the Cherokees were not a "foreign state" within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitu-
tion, and that, therefore, the case did not come under its original jurisdiction.
121. 328 US. 549 (1946).
122. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
It should be noted, however, that both cases are not squarely based upon the political
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I would raise the same objections to a possible variation of the "op-
portunistic" theory which would focus not upon the likelihood of the
parties' disobedience, but upon the willingness of the political institu-
tions and of the public to accept the Court's determination of a con-
troversial issue as authoritative. However controversial the issues
avoided in political question cases may have been, they cannot possibly
have been more hotly disputed than the constitutional questions con-
cerning the federal bank, 123 the Missouri compromise, 124 the federal
income tax, 2 5 child labor legislation,120 the New Deal, 27 Truman's
question doctrine and might be more satisfactorily explained on other grounds. In
Mississippi v. Johnson, supra, Chief Justice Chase relied on the distinction introduced in
Marbury v. Madison between ministerial duties and executive discretion, holding that
the Court would not restrain and enjoin the President in the performance of his constitu-
tional function to execute the laws of Congress; but he expressly reserved the Court's
power to review such acts after they had been performed:
The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President is the
executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial depart-
ment; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance. [Mississippi v. Johnson, supra, at 500.] [Emphasis added.]
And in Georgia v. Stanton, Justice Nelson refused to decide on the ground that Georgia
had not asserted the kind of "private" interests which could give it standing in an
equitable action:
[The rights for the protection of which our authority is invoked, are the rights of
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as a
State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges. No case of private rights
or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, Is
presented by the bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court. [Georgia v.
Stanton, supra, at 77.]
In both cases, the implication seems to be that the constitutional issues as such could be
decided by the Court in a case properly within its jurisdiction. And the Court has dealt
with similarly explosive issues arising from Reconstruction. See, e.g., White v. Hart, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 646 (1871); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Ex parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). And compare
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (where the Court found a similar lack of
standing), with United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (where substantive issues
involved in the Massachusetts case were decided).
123. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
124. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
125. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
126. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918).
127. Ashton v. Cameron County Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Hopkins Federal Savings 9- Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296
U.S. 315 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935);
Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement id. v.
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 888 (1935).
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seizure of the steel mills,'2 8 or school segregation.'O The Court's de-
terminations of these controversial issues and many more, may have
been right or wrong, politically wise or foolish, but surely they all
touched directly upon the "hypersensitive nerve of public opinion." I
submit that a Court which has weathered all these storms will not seek
shelter under the political question doctrine merely because it fears
that its determination of an issue might be unpopular, or even ex-
tremely unpopular. Of course, a wise Court will take account of the
likely reactions of the political departments and of public opinion
when it reaches its decision. As Dean Rostow has put it:
Exercising high political powers, the Court must have a high sense
of strategy and tactics. Its influence on our public life depends in
large part on the Court's skill in advocacy and its sensitivity to the
powerful forces which from time to time, in different combina-
tions, must resist its will. 30
At this point, it seems useful to introduce a normative distinction
between two kinds of conflicts. Courts, and constitutional courts in
particular, are necessarily operating in a field of tension between prin-
ciple as defined by the Court, and the reality of community life, a
"reality" which also includes the normative consensus of the commu-
nity about the principles which ought to govern its life. The law of
the Constitution can only be effective as long as the Court's interpre-
tation will not be utterly "unrealistic," overstraining and finally dis-
rupting this normative tension.
If such disruption should occur, if the Court should lose its sense
of political, social and economic reality, and of the community con-
sensus about what ought to be, I know of no doctrinal justification
either for persistence or for avoidance. The Court would simply be
wrong, and it should (and the President's use of his power to appoint
the Justices usually assures that it will131) speedily correct its sub-
stantive interpretation of the Constitution. This, rather than the adop-
tion of the political question doctrine which Finkelstein had recom-
mended, 3 2 is what happened with regard to the constitutional scope
128. Youngstown Sheet 9& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952).
129. Cooper v. Aaron, 258 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
130. RosroW, THE SOVmEIGN PR.RoATIVE 34 (1962). See generally SuApmO, LAw AND
PoLrncs IN THE SUPREmE CouRT 1-49 (1964).
131. See Dal, Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 283-91 (1957).
132. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HA-v. L. REv. 338, 345, 361-64 (1924);
Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HAv. L. Ray. 221, 243-44 (1925).
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of national and state powers to deal with social and economic prob-
lems. In such a conflict, there seems to have been no room for the
doctrine, and I am not aware that it has ever taken the place of an
unpopular and unrealistic line of prior decisions. 18 3
Theoretically the "opportunistic" theory might come into play in
conflicts where the Court's position is unpopular but nevertheless
"right," or at least not utterly unrealistic, and where its constitutional
rule would continue to express the "sober second thought of the com-
munity" against the majorities of the day. Such situations may, indeed,
call for "a high sense of strategy and tactics"-but these are also the
occasions when the Court may and does avail itself of its numerous
substantive and procedural devices for avoiding decisions on the merits,
with a view to the broader, prudential purposes which Professor Bickel
has described. In the martial-law cases arising from the Civil War and
133. One might argue that the cases dealing with the immunity of foreign state owned
or state operated ships will not fit into this general pattern. In this area, the Court, after
some hedging, had adopted the broad doctrine that such vessels, even if used for purely
commercial purposes, are not subject to in rem procedures based upon a creditor's
maritime lien. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. SS. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). This extensive grant of
immunity, which was in conflict with the prior position taken by the State Department
(see, e.g., the Department's submission in an earlier case involving the same Italian vessel:
The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)) was widely criticized as undesirable
because it deprived private creditors of their only practical remedy against foreign debtor
states, and because it tended to favor states which had nationalized sea transportation over
states respecting private enterprise. See, e.g., Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States
When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution, 27 Mien. L. Rav. 751
(1929); Fairman, Some Disputed Applications of the Principle of State Immunity, 22 A.M.
J. INT'L L. 566 (1928). See also: Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States, 28 BaRIT. YB. INT'L L. 220, 232-36 (1951); Comment, The jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 1149 (1954); Setser, The Immunities
of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 291, 292
(1959); McDOUGAL & BuRxE, THE PUBLIC ORDRa OF rm OCaNS 137-55 (1962).
But in spite of this criticism, the State Department, upon the recommendation of the
Attorney General did in fact adjust its own policy of issuing or denying "suggestions of
immunity" to the rule announced by the Court. 2 HAcawomTr, DiGEsr or INTERNATIONAL
LAw 429, 437, 446-47 (1941). Thus, while the Court was urged to reconsider its substantive
rule, there was no conflict at all with the political departments by the time the political
question doctrine was finally introduced to this field. Compania Espanola De Navegaclon
Maritime, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (dictum); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The Hoffman case, which held
that the Court would always accede to a suggestion of immunity issued by the State
Department, and that it would not grant immunity on grounds which the Department had
not previously recognized, led to a paradoxical situation in which the Department
continued to follow the Court's Pesaro doctrine, while the Court itself was waiting for
the Department's "adoption of any guiding policy." It was not until the Tate Letter of
1952 that the Department assumed this responsibility for the formulation of the law of
immunity which the Court had forced upon it. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting
of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DnT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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from World War II, the Court managed to postpone a vindication of
the Constitution until after the war was won;134 and in The Japanese
Relocation Cases which were decided during the war,' 35 the Court
chose to define the issues so narrowly that a sweeping legitimation of
this program was avoided, without provoking an unmanageable con-
flict with either the military or public opinion.
As long as the Court is not ready to abandon its responsibility for
the formulation and vindication of principle, it will usually find ways
to sidestep, postpone, limit, or in some other way make manageable
potential clashes with the political institutions and with public opinion
without having to resort to complete abdication. An opportunistic
theory, I submit, cannot satisfactorily explain the Court's actual use
of the political question doctrine.
2. A "Cognitive" Theory of the Political Question?
If political controversy about an issue and the dangers of a clash
with the political institutions will not, by themselves, account for the
Court's use of the doctrine, it might seem useful to extend the search
to an analysis of the legal nature of the issues which the Court has
avoided.' 36 Thus, Mr. Field has tried to explain all political question
cases in terms of "a lack of legal principles to apply to the questions
presented."' 37 And more broadly:
Whatever may be the difficulties in definitively describing the
differences between the judicial and the legislative department it
seems settled and clear that the court must have some rule to
follow before it can operate. Where no rules exist the court is
powerless to act. From this it follows that the courts cannot enter
into questions of statecraft and policy.138
Coming from an American jurist, even in 1924, this is a surprising
statement. I am at a loss to see how either the Common Law or Ameri-
134. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866).
135. Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214 (1944); Hiraba)ashi v. United States,
320 US. 81 (1943).
136. Even Mr. Finkelstein seems to have suggested as much when he advocated an
extension of the doctrine to the constitutional questions of economic and social legislation
because "the legislative industrial policy of a state or nation can hardly even be stated
in classical legal terminology." Judicial Self.Limitation, 37 HAv. L. REv. 338, 363 (1924).
See also Miss Strum's thesis, op. cit. supra note 110.
137. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 .Mur. L R.'.
485, 512 (1924).
138. Id. at 511.
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can constitutional law could have grown and flourished if the courts
had been unable or unwilling to perform the creative functions which
this cognitive theory so categorically disavows for them.
Furthermore, this theory would clearly not apply to a number of
political-question areas. For instance, in the cases dealing with legis-
lative procedure, there was no doubt about the "legal principles"
that would have applied: only bills which were in fact voted upon by
Congress, and only bills passed in the presence of a quorum have the
force of law, and Senate amendments to a revenue bill must be "ger-
mane" to its subject matter.130 Similarly, by the time the Court de-
cided to treat the immunity of foreign ships as a political question,
there existed a body of immunity law which the Court itself had cre-
ated and in which the executive department had long since ac-
quiesced. 140
It is true that, in Baker v. Carr,'41 Justice Frankfurter attempted to
show that a lack of "standards meet for judicial judgment" was one of
the dominant factors for the political question; and he insisted that
the issues of malapportionment should also be treated as political be-
cause "there is not-as there has never been-a standard by which
the place of equality as a factor in apportionment can be measured."'142
And Justice Brennan's majority opinion, disagreeing with Frankfurter's
thesis without fully meeting its thrust,1 48 also cited "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" as "one of the analytical
threads that make up the political question doctrine."' 44
I find it difficult to accept this analysis on cognitive grounds. There
was surely no dearth of possible standards for reapportionment. The
Court could have chosen a "minimum rationality test," either in the
139. See note 106 supra.
140. See note 133 supra.
141. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
142. Id. at 289, 322-23.
143. Brennan conceded that if appellants had relied on the guarantee clause their claim
would have been non-justiciable because of a "lack of standards," but added that "because
any reliance on the Guaranty Clause could not have succeeded it does not follow that
appellants may not be heard on the equal protection claim which in fact they tender."
Id. at 227.
This is, of course, wholly unresponsive to Frankfurter's argument. He had not claimed
that these voters should fail because they also could have raised a claim under the
guarantee clause, but because the question of the "reasonableness" of apportionment under
the equal protection clause was itself a question of the "theoretic base of representation
in an acceptably republican state," so that the equal protection claim was "in effect, a
Guaranty Clause claim masquerading under a different label." Id. at 297. This analysis
seems absolutely compelling, but of the members of the majority only Justice Douglas
seemed willing to answer it by suggesting that not all guarantee clause issues should be
treated as non-justiciable. Id. at 242, n.2.
144. 369 U.S. at 211, 217.
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extreme form advocated by Justice Harlan, who found "a classic legis-
lative judgment" underlying (and justifying) even fifty-one years of
legislative inaction, 45 or in the qualified form, requiring a minimum
of consistency, which was expressed in Justice Clark's "crazy quilt
test."'140 Or the Court could have, as it now has,14 7 adopted an (almost)
unqualified standard of numerical equality. While this "absolute"
test will not solve all constitutional problems of apportionment, 48 it
seems to me most securely rooted in principle,149 and, surely, it is the
one standard which, given the Court's workload and the efficiency of its
fact-finding processes, would appear most manageable. But even if the
members of the majority had not had in mind one of these "easy"
solutions when they decided Baker v. Carr without reaching the merits,
I would find Frankfurter's case for judicial agnosticism less than com-
pelling. Even if one were to concede that, in the light of American
145. Id. at 336. Accordingly, Justice Harlan would have dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a federal cause of action, rather than on political question grounds.
146. 369 U.S. at 254, 258.
147. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S.
695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 US. 678 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representa-
tion v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc., v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (194); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders. 372
US. 368 (1963).
148. Of course, even where the districts are numerically equal, plurality elections in
single-member districts (and even more in the multi-member districts which the Court
considered permissible in Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 147) can be drastically influenced
by the drawing of district lines. I doubt that the Court can indefinitely avoid such issues,
as it did in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 US. 52 (1964), and I expect that it will then have
to supplement its one-man-one-vote standard with a qualified rationality (or due process)
test. I do not see, however, how these additional difficulties, which can be met if and when
they arise, should in any way undercut the validity of the one-man-one-vote rule.
149. My own reaction is probably influenced by a background where democracy has
been, and is, more immediately and more obviously competing against other traditional
and modem theories of government. If it is the burden of political theory to explain why
governmental power should be accepted as legitimate and should be obeyed (and, by the
same token, to define the situations where government becomes an illegitimate exercise
of naked power) it would seem that democratic theory, basing government on the consent
of the governed, could not give less weight to one citizen's consent than to that of another
without destroying its own foundation.
Of course, political science tells us that, regardless of the weight of our votes, our
scores on the power scale will vary as widely as they do with regard to wealth, enlighten-
ment, skill, and the other Lasswellian value categories. But there is wisdom, I believe, in
not being sophisticated about the fundamentals of the Faith, and in insisting that when
we go to the polls to elect the government that rules us, we must all be equal. Surely.
there is enough room for the sophisticated accommodation and balancing of interests
and values other than equality in geographical districting, in requirements for qualified
legislative majorities for certain decisions, in the system of checks and balances among
political institutions, and, most important, in the patterns and practices of group poli-
tics, so that we need not tamper with democratic tenets in order to allay the unlikely
specter of tyranny by single-minded urban majorities.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
history, numerical equality should not be the only relevant standard
for apportionment, it would nonetheless seem possible to identify and
define whatever other purposes and values should be considered as
legitimately relevant to the shaping of the electoral process. In the
absence of a compelling absolute standard, surely reasonable and fair-
minded (and well-informed) men ought to be able to agree whether
and to what extent a given apportionment scheme legitimately reflects
those
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience,
economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular
local groups, communications, the practical effects of political in-
stitutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions
and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long
experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses
compiling relevant data, and a host of otherseo
which Frankfurter mentioned to show that the job could not be done.
The job would have been difficult, but not because the standards of a
"legitimacy test" could not be rationally discussed and determined.151
It would have been difficult because the only test which Frankfurter
was willing to consider would have required the courts to obtain an
accurate and detailed map of the political landscape in every state
before they could arrive at any responsible judgment. Rather than a
"lack of standards," the problem at the bottom of Justice Frankfurter's
dissent may well have been the inadequacy of judicial fact-finding
processes for the administration of one particularly fact-oriented sub-
stantive standard. I may be quite misguided in this, but the idea that,
after almost one hundred eighty years of constitutional history based
upon a much longer tradition of political theory, the Supreme Court
should find itself without any guidelines in principle on one of the
most basic constitutional issues strikes me as particularly unpersuasive.
And if it were so, I might add, then I fail to see why the Court should
not have upheld malapportionment as "not unconstitutional."
3. A "Normative" Theory of the Political Question?
In a recent article, Professor Jaffe has restated the question of stan-
dards in normative, rather than cognitive, terms:
150. 369 U.S. at 323.
151. It seems to me that the editors of the YALE LAW JOURNAL have gone a long way
in proving the feasibility of such an undertaking: Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legis.
lative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963).
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We have seen that the Constitution grants to the President certain
powers which imply certain further auxiliary powers. But there
may be something about the nature of these powers which, in
addition to their constitutional assignment, marks them as "politi-
cal." Many of the questions that arise are of the sort for which we
do not choose, or have not been able as yet to establish, strongly
guiding rules. We may believe that the job is better done without
rules, or that even though there are applicable rules, these rules
should be only among the numerous relevant considerations.1 2
The first of these alternative rationales, "that the job is done better
without rules," appears to be the less persuasive one. If we are sure
that certain congressional or presidential decisions should not be gov-
erned by legal principles, then I fail to see why the Court should not
make that clear by ruling on the merits that these decisions are valid
(because not unlawful).153
In political question decisions, by contrast, the Court refuses to apply
legal principles which are relevant to the disposition of the case:
whether a statute was passed in accordance with the constitutionally
prescribed procedure,6 4 whether an amendment proposed by Congress
thirteen years ago had lost its vitality,'r whether initiative and refer-
endum are compatible with a republican form of government, 60
whether a particular state of facts justified a call-up of the militia,6 7
or a blockade of southern ports which, under international law, had to
be respected by neutral ships, 58 whether a certain territory had come
under the sovereignty of the United States,' 9 whether a treaty had
been validly concluded, 60 or whether it was still in force'61-- all these
were questions to which, in the Court's opinion, the law provided an
answer. This appears to be true even with regard to the recognition
of foreign sovereignty, 02 and the unilateral derogation of treaties by
152. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HIAR%.. L. R'. 1265,
1303 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
153. This seems also to be Professor Bickel's view. See BicKEL, TuE LEAsr DNC.mEous
BRANCH 186 (1962).
154. See cases cited supra note 106.
155. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
156. Kiernan v. Portland, Ore., 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon. 223
US. 118 (1912).
157. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
158. The Prize Cases, 67 US. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
159. See cases cited supra note 89.
160. See cases cited supra note 97.
161. See cases cited supra notes 98-101.
162. See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., ,8 U.S. (13 Pet.) 357 (1839), where
the question whether the government of Buenos Aires could lawfully exclude American
sealers from the Falkland Islands, or whether its proclamations were no more -alid than
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
act of Congress. 16 3 In these last instances, the problem was not one of
constitutional law (which probably does not prescribe substantive rules
governing recognition or derogation of treaties) but of international
law (under which the United States might have recognized the wrong
power, and renounced its treaty obligations without justification). As
long as the Court regards international law as part of the body of
prescriptions which it will apply,164 questions of international law, like
questions of constitutional law, are questions of law which the Court
could theoretically decide. In a political question decision, the Court
does not hold that legal rules do not apply; it holds that competence
to apply them should rest with the political departments.
This objection seems to be met by the alternative explanation
offered by Mr. Jaffe, "that even though there are applicable rules,
these rules should be only among the numerous relevant considera-
tions." In this form, in which it has become the foundation of Pro-
fessor Bickel's theory of the political question,03 the thesis appears
extremely persuasive: if the Court does regard legal principles as
relevant for particular decisions, but still refuses to apply and to en-
force them, then one might plausibly interpret this result as a (perhaps
unarticulated) concession to the relevance of extra-legal factors. This
thesis offers an explanation of political question decisions which can-
not be disestablished by merely citing a series of cases which would not
fit into the postulated pattern.
Furthermore, as Professor Bickel has shown,";0 it is entirely possible
to interpret Justice Frankfurter's position in Colegrove and Baker in
terms of this normative judgment, rather than in the cognitive terms
which I have discussed above. If Professor Bickel's interpretation is
correct, however, Justice Frankfurter might still have been able to
decide these cases on the merits, taking into account the relevance
the "idle threat of any individual who might assume to exercise power," id. at 362, was
clearly one to be answered under international law. See also Chief Justice Fuller's some.
what inept but very revealing handling of a similar question in Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205
U.S. 257 (1907), where he proceeded at length to interpret the Spanish American
treaty of peace of 1898 in order to determine whether the Isle of Pines had been ceded
to the United States, before he finally referred to the official American recognition of
Cuba's de facto sovereignty over the island as a conclusive determination of the issue.
163. See especially Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (No. 13799) (C.C. Mass. 1855),
in which Justice Curtis discussed at length whether Russia's conduct might have
justified, under international law, the abrogation of a most.favored-nation treaty by a
later tariff act. See also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (dictum).
164. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
165. BicKEL, op. cit. supra note 153, at 185-97.
166. Id. at 191.
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(and legitimacy), for apportionment, of factors other than numerical
equality.167
My objection can be stated more broadly: where the Court was per-
suaded that the political departments ought to be able to act with a
view to non-legal factors-economic, political, military, international-
and expediency, it has usually been willing to allow for this freedom
of action through its substantive interpretation of the scope of con-
stitutional power and discretion, and its flexible definition of constitu-
tional limitations, varying with the necessities of the situation. This
permissive approach is familiar enough in the field of the taxing power,
in the post-l937 commerce and due process cases, and in the decisions
concerning the protection of individuals against exercises of the war
power,168 culminating in The Japanese Relocation Cases.2- If even
the need to accommodate non-legal factors could be met by decisions
on the merits, then Mr. Jaffe's second formula does not seem to estab-
lish a compelling necessity for the Court's reliance on the political
question doctrine.
This objection is, of course, premised upon a preference for decisions
on the merits, and for that reason it is not responsive to the thesis
which Professor Bickel has built upon Jaffe's formula. The important
thing for Bickel is not that the Court decide at all, but that it decide
correctly, that is in conformity with principle:
The role of the Court and its raison d'etre are to evolve "to pre-
167. This is shown 13y McDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), a decision on the
merits which, though not written by Justice Frankfurter, was at least accepted by him.
168. See, e.g., Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115, 121 (1937) (holding that con-
fiscation of enemy assets was an exercise of the war power untrammeled by the due
process and just compensation clauses); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,
305 (1870). See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 US. 503 (1944) (applying an extremely
permissive variation of "substantive due process" to economic regulations under the war
power); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920). It should also be emphasized that
the "clear and present danger test" as formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) and in Abrams v. United States, 250 US. 616, 6-28
(1919) (dissenting opinion), was intended to vary with the necessity for repression of
speech. This willingness to accommodate a (proven) military necessity was also evident
in the cases dealing with the requisitioning of citizens' assets. United States v. Russell.
80 US. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 US. (13 How.) 115, 134-35 (1851).
Cf. United States v. Caltex Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). Even the "open court rule" an-
nounced in Ex parte Milhigan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866), must be understood as a
generalized and abstract attempt to accommodate both constitutional rights of the indi-
vidual and military necessity. And in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US. 304 (1946). the
members of the majority and the dissenters were agreed that if the trial of civilians by
military commission on Hawaii had indeed been required by military necessity it would,
by the same token, have been constitutional.
169. Supra note 135.
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serve, protect and defend" principle. If the political institutions
at last insist upon a course of action that cannot be accommodated
to principle, it is no part of the function of the Court to bless it,
however double-negatively."70
Thus, Professor Bickel would regard The Japanese Relocation Cases as
proving, rather than contradicting, his thesis."1 Instead of finally, even
if hesitatingly and narrowly, legitimating the removal of citizens of
Japanese descent from the West Coast, the Court would have done
better-if it could not bring itself to intervene-to invoke the political
question doctrine as Justice Jackson had urged it to do.172 Professor
Bickel's theory of the political question follows from his understanding
of the Court's role. As a theory about what the Court ought to do, it
seems immune from criticism on purely empirical grounds. It should
be discussed, and I am very much aware of the temerity of my under-
taking, in terms of its desirability as a rule for the Court.
My first doubts concern the expansion of the list of issues which the
Court may, or should, avoid that this theory seems to imply. One need
not subscribe to Schumpeter's understanding of political decisions in
a democracy as mere by-products of the competition for power, 170 to
recognize that they are rarely if ever pure implementations of prin-
ciple. Legislative and executive decisions are surely subjected to, and
occasioned by, manifold compulsions, pressures and temptations of
economic, social, political (domestic and international) and military
necessity, expediency or opportunity--extra-legal factors, that is, the
relevance of which for the political departments is obvious, and which
the Court also may not completely disregard in its determinations of
the validity of such decisions. If such extra-legal factors may call for
the application of the political question doctrine, one may well ask
whether there will ever be circumstances which would permit judicial
intervention on grounds of principle.
Of course, for Messrs. Jaffe and Bickel this raises a normative ques-
tion. The answer would depend on the degree to which either prin-
ciple or these non-legal considerations ought to determine govern-
mental action in any given situation.174 But with what doubts will
170. BIcKEL, op. cit. supra note 153, at 188.
171. See id. at 139.
172. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (1944).
173. ScHuZmErm, CAPIrrLisM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269-73 (2d cd. 1947).
174. For instance, Professor Bickel maintains that "apportionment is necessarily a
very high percentage of politics with a very small admixture of definable principle"
while "in race relations the proportions are reversed." Op. cit. supra note 153, at 193.
I think it would, at least in 1954, have been hard to verify this thesis by any empirical
[V/ol. 75:517
THE POLITICAL QUESTION
such a judgment be infected once the Court has conceded that, for
certain decisions, and for certain situations which will differ only in
degree from the "normal" characteristics of any constitutional case,
the authority of the Constitution must give way to the relevance of
other factors? The Court would have to explain and justify, not ab-
stention as it now does, but the exercise of judicial review; it would
have to face anew in each instance Judge Hand's pregnant question
of "how importunately the situation demands an answer."'17
For Professor Bickel, these implications might well be acceptable
because, in his view, even an abstention on political question grounds
need not prevent the Court from exercising its true function:
Even when it is ultimately constrained to yield to necessity, how-
ever-to yield, this is to say, to the judgment of the political in-
stitutions-the Court can exert immense influence. It may be
unable to wield its ultimate power as an organ of government
charged with translating principle into positive law; but it need
not abandon its concomitant role of "teacher to the citizenry."
The power to which Marshall successfully laid claim is not the full
measure of the Court's authority in our day. And the Court's argu-
ments need not be compulsory in order to be compelling. Many
of the devices of not doing engage the Court, as I have shown, in
colloquies with the political institutions. By their very nature,
with hardly a word spoken in further explanation, vagueness and
delegation, for example, ask for a legislative affirmation of just
what it is that necessity demands. But the Court can at the same
time do more. It can see to it that the political judgment of neces-
sity is undertaken with awareness of the principle on which it
impinges. In American life, the Court is second only to the presi-
dency in having effectively at its disposal the resources of rhetoric.
Hence... the Court can explain the principle that is in play and
praise it, and thus also guard its integrity. It can do so even when
no device is available for authoritatively drawing the political in-
stitutions into a colloquy near the bench. For the Court can speak
over their heads to the nation. 7 6
I have quoted at some length because this passage, wholly apart from
the empirical question of whether the political question doctrine
has often been employed in this exhortatory fashion, seems to state
the most problematical aspect of Mr. Bickel's thesis. Where concessions
to necessity and expediency cannot be avoided, Bickel would have
the Court rely on its resources of rhetoric to explain and praise pure
test--say, a public opinion poll. It seems meaningful mainly as a statement of normative
preference.
175. HAD , THE ]BILL oF RIG MS 15 (1958).
176. BicKEr, op. cit. supra note 153, at 187-88.
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principle; but in following this advice, the Court might well jeopardize
the responsibility of constitutional interpretation and the effectiveness
of principle, whose integrity it should guard.
Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States177
illustrates my point. The majority of the Court had, on doubtful evi-
dence perhaps, upheld the evacuation from the West Coast of citizens
of Japanese descent as a reasonably necessary, and therefore constitu-
tional, exercise of the war power. Applying the same test, Justice
Murphy dissented because he found no "reasonable relation to an
'immediate, imminent and impending' public danger" that would have
justified such measures. 178 Justice Jackson alone advocated recourse to
the political question. In his opinion the courts should neither convict
violators of the evacuation orders nor intercede against the evacua-
tion and detention programs on applications of habeas corpus or
otherwise.
He granted that, as a practical matter, "defense measures will not,
and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil au-
thority in peace." But unlike the other members of the Court, Jack-
son was not willing to make allowances for the exigencies of war in
his interpretation of the Constitution:
I cannot say, from any evidence before me, that the orders of
General DeWitt were not reasonably expedient military precau-
tions, nor could I say that they were. But even if they were permis-
sible military procedures, I deny that it follows that they are con-
stitutionalY19
For Jackson, the "reasonableness" of these measures at the time when
they were adopted was irrelevant; they were unconstitutional because
similar measures in time of peace would have been clearly unconsti-
tutional. Disregarding Justice Frankfurter's admonition that the war
power is as much a part of the Constitution as the Bill of Rights, 180
and disregarding the whole weight of prior decisions which had con-
sistently defined the protection of individuals against the war power
as varying with the necessities of the situation,' 8' Jackson now postu-
177. Note 172 supra. Professor Bickel quotes approvingly some of the pertinent pas-
sages of this dissent. Op. cit. supra note 153, at 131.
178. 323 U.S. at 235.
Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that defendant had been subjected to
conflicting orders. 323 U.S. at 225-33. But otherwise he would also have applied the
reasonableness test. Id. at 231 n.8.
179. 323 U.S. at 245.
180. 323 U.S. at 224-25.
181. See cases cited supra note 168. Of course, the cases differed with regard to (a) the
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lated the absolute immutability of constitutional guarantees-a con-
stitutional theory which he could not possibly have proclaimed, had
he not at the same time disclaimed every intention ever to enforce it.
Such a decision, I submit, does not even have the relevance of an ad-
visory opinion which, while not binding, is expected to provide prac-
ticable answers to questions of law arising out of a concrete situation.
Jackson's interpretation of the Constitution is, in the context of this
dissent, no more than the proclamation of an admittedly unworkable
moral ideal.
This temptation would lure the Court if it were permitted to ex-
plain and praise principle without taking even the intellectual re-
sponsibility for the realization of its postulated goals. Ultimately, such
a practice would destroy even the Court's usefulness as a "teacher to
the citizenry" on which Professor Bickel places so much emphasis. What
would be the persuasiveness of an interpretation of the Constitution
which the interpreter himself could not wish to see put into practice?
From what revelation should the Court derive authority to proclaim
moral postulates-or have its judgments any legitimacy beyond that
of an intellectual honesty disciplined by its responsibility for the dis-
position of the concrete case?
Like Justice Jackson, Professor Bickel urges the Court not to distort
the Constitution in order to accommodate unprincipled, but over-
powering, reality. But the remedy which he has prescribed against
"Plessy v. Ferguson's Error," named "after the case that legitimated
segregation in 1896,182 may be worse than the danger. It would sacri-
fice that realism of constitutional interpretation which is the necessary
condition of its effectiveness. Interpretation which would no longer
be answerable to the real conditions and exigencies of community life
would transform constitutional law into a collection of programmatic
postulates to be worshipped on the Fourth of July; and the easier it
would be for the Court to retreat from conflicts in the real world into
the ideal realm of pure principle, the less ready and able would it be
to protect the community against transgression of its fundamental code.
degree of necessity which the Court will regard as sufficient to justify an invasion of
individual rights (and here the importance of the right at stake, and its "absolute" or
flexible definition in the Constitution may be the decisive variable) and (b) the extent
to which the Court will re-examine a political or military judgment that such a degree
of necessity in fact existed (for which the time of decision, during or after the war,
seems to be not altogether irrelevant). But not even in its most "activist" decisions has
the Court ever suggested that the exigencies of emergency should be totally disregarded
in defining the scope of constitutional guarantees vis.&-vis the war power.
182. BCicEL, op. cit. supra note 153, at 197.
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Unlike Mark Antony, Mr. Bickel's Court would come to praise the
Constitution. But I doubt that this would make it any less a funeral
oration.
V. A FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
My own understanding of the political question begins with the con-
clusions which I have tried to establish above: The cases cannot be
satisfactorily explained in terms of a consistent interpretation of the
constitutional grants of power. The Court has available such a wide
variety of procedural and substantive devices for not deciding, and it
has in fact decided such a long list of explosive issues, that it appears
rather unpersuasive to explain the political question doctrine purely
in terms of an opportunistic retreat from "prickly" cases or issues.
Nor can one justify the political question cases on the grounds that
the Court was convinced that it could not define, or that there were no,
applicable legal standards. On the contrary, the doctrine presupposes
the relevance of such standards. Finally, the Court is generally will-
ing and able to define realistic and flexible substantive standards which
will accommodate the legitimate demands of economic, social, politi-
cal and military practice. The Court, therefore, need not use the
political question doctrine to assure the political departments of broad
discretion.
I am of course aware that I have overemphasized the objections that
can be raised against each of the theories which have been discussed.
Undeniably, these theories all have relevance for some situations and
they may even offer the most persuasive explanation for certain cases,
or at least come closest to the rationales expressed in some opinions
of the Court. Their major weakness, I submit, lies in their intended
generality which does not account for the narrowly circumscribed, ex-
ceptional character of the political question cases. They are, therefore,
at odds with the empirical finding that the Supreme Court will decide
on the merits the overwhelming majority of all cases which it accepts
for decision, and that it does in fact claim the tasks of finding, inter-
preting and applying the law as its own "province and duty." A theory
which would realistically explain why the Court should delegate this
function for a very limited number of issues to the political depart-
ments would have to be of a correspondingly limited scope.
I am persuaded that much, if not all, of the Court's political ques-
tion practice should, like the procedural and jurisdictional techniques
of avoidance, be explained in functional terms, as the Court's ac-
knowledgment of the limitations of the American judicial process. But
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the difficulties encountered by the broader theories should serve as a
reminder of the pitfalls of all generalization in this field. A satisfactory
explanation of the political question doctrine is necessarily tied to the
specifics of individual cases. Short of an exhaustive analysis of the case
law, which is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible only to point
out and discuss some of the functional factors and considerations which,
in various combinations, may persuade the Court that in deciding a
particular issue it would overreach the limits of its own responsibility.
1. Difficulties of Access to Information
Judicial competence to decide may be doubtful if the Court is not
assured of full clarification of all relevant questions of fact and law.
When a lack of information affects the individual case only, it may
bring into play the procedural or jurisdictional requirements of "stand-
ing to raise the issue," "ripeness" or "adversariness." When resolution
of the issue as such would require information which is generally diffi-
cult to obtain, the Court may redefine the substantive standards in the
"absolute" or "abstract" terms of an unqualified grant of power or of
an unqualified limitation upon power, whichever appears more desira-
ble to the Court. But this non-realistic solution is possible only in areas
with which the Court is sufficiently familiar to assume that an "abso-
lute" standard, though not responsive to the variables of individual
cases, can provide for a tenable and workable accommodation of the
broader interests at stake. When an absolute solution is not acceptable,
an information problem which is inherent in an issue may justify the
application of the political question doctrine.
This function of the doctrine is most obvious in the cases touching
upon foreign relations where the Court has generally been hesitant to
trust its own understanding of the broader situation. To the extent that
a decision would depend upon the evaluation of a fact-situation abroad,
the Court's means of gathering the relevant data would seem to be
much inferior to those of the executive, particularly when such ques-
tions arise, as they often do, in suits between domestic private parties.
It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, that the Court often accepts
without further investigation the official determinations of the Presi-
dent or the State Department, presumably based upon information
supplied by the foreign service or by other intelligence-gathering agen-
cies. If the government is a party, or if the validity of a governmental
decision should depend upon such data, the problem for the Court may
be somewhat different, although no more manageable. With regard to
the President's participation in licensing of international air transpor-
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tation, Justice Jackson expressed the sense of the full Court in these
terms:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant informa-
tion, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive
taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in
camera in order to be taken into executive confidences.1 3
Thus, if the Court is unable to force the disclosure of information
underlying a political decision, it may be forced not only to accept
statements of fact as true, but also to accept the decision as valid.
This information problem by itself might go far towards explaining
the political question cases in which the validity of a treaty depended
upon the constitutional authority of the partner,8 4 or upon the con-
tinuing existence of the partner state.185 It may also help to explain the
cases concerning the territorial boundaries of foreign states, 8 0 and the
existence of foreign states, governments, belligerents and insurgents.8 7
That the problem in these "recognition" cases was often no more than
one of information seems to follow from those decisions which either
treated the existence of a foreign de facto government as a matter of
judicial notice or found evidence for it in official declarations which
were not intended as a "recognition."' 88
The case for basing the political question doctrine on the informa-
tion problem seems weaker when the Court is faced with purely domes-
tic issues. But even here the rationale of inadequate information has
obtained some significance for the decisions concerning the ratification
183. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948). Justices Douglas, Black, Reed, and Rutledge dissented only on the issue of whether
those parts of the challenged order of the Civil Aeronautics Board which were not modified
by the President should also be immune from judicial review. Their position seems
difficult to maintain because the President might (for international or political reasons)
have approved of the order as it stood, and because the dissenters apparently did not
assume that the Court could compel the President to explain the reasons for his approval.
For these reasons, I am also unpersuaded by the criticisms of this decision advanced by
Professor John P. Frank and by Professor Jaffe. Frank, Political Questions, in Sur'ital.
COURT AND SuPREME LAw 36 (Cahn, ed. 1954); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 11, 71
HARv. L. REv. 769, 779-81 (1958). See also Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative
Processes in Which the President Participates, 74 HARV. L. REv. 684, 691 (1961).
184. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
185. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
186. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 414 (1839).
187. See cases cited note 93 supra.
188. See cases cited note 94 supra.
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of constitutional amendments, legislative enactments and the duration
of the Civil War.
In Coleman v. Miller,89 the Court was asked to determine whether
Kansas had, in 1937, validly ratified the Child Labor Amendment
which Congress had proposed thirteen years earlier. Petitioners, mem-
bers of the Kansas legislature who had voted against ratification, as-
serted, among other objections, that the proposed amendment had lost
its vitality because it had not been ratified within a "reasonable time"
by the requisite number of states. For this contention they relied upon
an earlier decision' 90 in which the Court, upholding a seven-year limit
upon ratification imposed by Congress, had rather persuasively ex-
plained that there was a fair implication in Article V of the Constitu-
tion that 7atification must be sufficiently contemporaneous in order to
reflect the will of the people in all sections of the country at relatively
the same time. While petitioners were unsuccessful on all grounds, the
members of the majority of the Court disagreed on the reasons for
their disposition of the case. Chief Justice Hughes, writing an "opinion
of the Court" which was supported by only two other justices, accepted
the constitutional standard invoked by petitioners as relevant. But he
went on to explain that the determination of what was a "reasonable
time" for ratification could not be based exclusively upon the prior
practice of relatively speedy ratification:
[T]here are additional matters to be examined and weighed.
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of eco-
nomic needs, it would be necessary, in determining whether a rea-
sonable time had elapsed since its submission, to consider the
economic conditions prevailing in the country, whether these had
so far changed since the submission as to make the proposal no
longer responsive to the conception which inspired it or whether
conditions were such as to intensify the feeling of need and the
appropriateness of the proposed remedial action. In short, the
question of a reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in
this case it does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be
said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a
court of justice and as to which it would be an extravagant exten-
sion of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of
deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an amend-
ment actually ratified. On the other hand, these conditions are
appropriate for the consideration of the political departments of
the Government. The questions they involve are essentially polit-
189. 307 U.S. 453 (1939).
190. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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ical and not justiciable. They can be decided by Congress with
the full knowledge and appreciation ascribed to the national legis-
lature of the political, social and economic conditions which have
prevailed during the period since the submission of the amend-
ment.19
1
By redefining "reasonable time" as referring not only to a sufficiently
contemporaneous expression of the will of the pouvoir constituant
(which might have justified the announcement of a rigid time limit),
but also to the continuing economic need for the amendment, the
Chief Justice adopted a substantive standard for whose application the
Court's access to information was inadequate. Of course, the Chief
Justice could have chosen another substantive standard which would
not have presented these difficulties (just as Justice Frankfurter could
have chosen different standards for reapportionment in Baker v.
Carr92), but once he had committed himself to this fact-oriented defi-
nition of reasonable time, the application of the political question
doctrine appears as a defensible acknowledgment of Congress' superior
institutional capacity to ascertain these "legislative facts."
There also was a problem of information in the cases in which the
validity of a statute depended upon the identity of the text which was
promulgated with the text which had been passed by Congress, upon
the presence of a quorum at the time of passage, or upon the origin of
a revenue clause in the House. 193 Here, too, the official declarations of
the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate and the Presi-
dent, presumably based upon an intimate and direct knowledge of the
legislative process, may have been accepted as conclusive because of
their closer and more reliable access to the relevant data. By itself, how-
ever, this rationale would not appear altogether compelling, and in a
few of these cases the Court did indeed ("for the sake of argument")
take a look at the legislative journals to show that the challenges had no
basis in fact. 94 It seems more important that the Court was here faced
191. 307 U.S. at 453-54.
192. See text following note 151 supra.
It is interesting to note that Hughes, who had just defined the criteria, went on to
obscure the information problem by his reference to the "lack of satisfactory criteria for
judicial determination," citing Field's article which had postulated the "cognitive theory
of the political question," 307 U.S. 454-55, a pattern which was again followed by Frank-
furter in Baker v. Carr.
193. See cases cited note 106 supra.
194. This was done in United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., Lyons v. Woods, Flint
v. Stone Tracy Co., and Rainey v. United States, note 106 supra. The possibility of a
further challenge to the correctness of the journals was, however, categorically denied In
the Ballin, Joseph case. 144 U.S. at 4.
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with the "dear mistake" dilemma 95 in which any examination of the
facts of enactment would have had to proceed on the assumption that
the highest legislative and executive officers might have conspired to
violate the dearest of duties. Furthermore, the issues of fact in these
cases were so easy for any member of the legislature to determine, that
the Court may very well have regarded the inaction of the majorities in
Congress, which would have been the only injured parties and which,
at the same time, would have been fully competent to correct any abuse
of trust or unintentional mistakes, as conclusive proof that no such
mistakes had in fact occurred.
The information problem also played a part in the decisions which
treated the dates of duration of the Civil War as a political question.1 °0
195. It has always seemed to me that the "rule of the dear mistake." in which courts
and commentators alike have found a measure of protection for judicial review as well
as a justification for judicial self-restraint, is not only vulnerable on analytical grounds
(see, e.g., BEca.K., op. cit. supra note 153, at 35-46) but actually misleading. If, for once,
the courts were really faced with a very dear mistake,-"so dear that it is not open to
rational question," as James Bradley Thayer has put it-they would, by the same token,
also be faced with an intentional violation of the Constitution and, in its most extreme
form, with a revolutionary act. And it seems rather unlikely that, if the political
departments had decided to commit a "dear mistake," they would be stopped by a
judicial decision explaining what must have been obvious all the time.
Of course, much may depend upon who committed the "mistake"-the states, in-
ferior federal officers, or Congress and the President acting in conjunction. But at least
when Congress or the President are involved, one might say almost by way of definition
that judicial review will be most effective precisely for doubtful questions, when reason-
able men might differ about the meaning of the Constitution so that each side cannot
honestly be absolutely certain of the rightness of its position and, therefore, may be
open to persuasion or at least willing to see the need for an authoritative settlement
of the issue.
196. See Adger v. Alston, 82 US. (15 Wall.) 555 (1873); Freeborn v. The Protector,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871).
To explain the Court's broader practice in this area, it is necessary to introduce the
following analytical distinction:
(1) Where the existence of a state of war in the international sense is directly relevant
to the decision of a case, as it is for the law of prize, the Court will of course be bound
by the declaration of war and by the official termination of war in a treaty of peace or
by a joint resolution of Congress or, for the Civil War, by a Presidential proclamation
(but the Court may have to decide which of these modes of termination is decisive):
Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912); Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904);
The Panama, 176 U.S. 535 (1900); The Buena Ventura, 175 U.S. 384 (1899); The Pedro,
175 U.S. 354 (1899).
(2) The duration of war is also directly relevant to the application of the procedural
rules that alien enemies cannot sue, and that the statutes of limitation will not run for
or against them, during the existence of a state of war. This was the issue in the Civil
War cases, supra, and in numerous cases decided during and after the First and Second
World Wars. I have the impression that the Court's reference to the termination of
war by some "official act," rather than to the re-establishment of "peace.in-fact." is often
occasioned more by considerations of notice to the parties than by any logical necessity
19%]
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But, again, there were additional considerations. Even if the Court had
obtained all available information about unrest, incidents, skirmishes
and military operations, it would have been extremely difficult to deter-
mine the points in time between which the situation was to be qualified
as a state of war. On the other hand, the President was responsible for
the peace and security of the nation and thus necessarily had to deter-
mine when, and for how long, specifically military action was required.
to follow the official determinations. See, e.g., Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca dl
Navigazione, 248 U.S. 9, 22-3 (1918), and especially First Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh v.
Anglo-Oesterreichische Bank, 37 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1930), where the Court held that the
statute of limitations had begun to run again on November 17, 1921, even though the
Presidential proclamation of that date had declared that the war with Austria had ended
by virtue of the Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921. What was decisive was not the termina-
tion itself, but the date on which the parties had clear notice of the termination.
(3) The duration of war may further be relevant for the constitutional issue of
whether a given situation justifies regulations based upon the war power. Of course,
certain aspects of the war power, such as the power to raise and support armies, may
be exercised at any time, and may become the basis for further implied powers even
in time of peace. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 326-28
(1936). But given the broad scope of the "power to wage war successfully," its precedence
over all considerations of federalism, and its potential impact upon individual rights,
it seems necessary to limit the occasions in which the full measure of the power should
be available.
However, the duration of the war in a technical (international) sense would not appear
to be a rational constitutional criterion. It might be too restrictive, denying Congress the
power to deal with problems created by war and continuing during a post-war period.
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1948); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
& Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947); Hamilton v. Kentucky Warehouse Distilleries
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07 (1871). Or It
might be too permissive under modern conditions where treaties of peace or even joint
resolutions terminating the state of war will not necessarily follow closely upon the
termination of hostilities.
The constitutional problem of the duration of the war power appears, therefore, to be
quite similar to the question of whether a given situation justifies exceptional exertions
of the police power of the states or of the District of Columbia. Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
The political question doctrine has been applied to this constitutional Issue only when
an exercise of the war power against alien enemies was challenged. Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 167-70 & n.12 (1948); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57
(1923). In all "domestic" cases, the Court has usually upheld the regulation while Insisting
upon its ultimate power to decide this constitutional issue.
(4) Finally, the duration of war may present itself as a question of statutory Interpreta-
tion if an act of Congress, by its terms, applies for the duration, or does not apply "in
time of peace." Unless the constitutional problem discussed under (3) above is relevant,
this question would seem to be answered by a reference to the intent of Congress (for which
the time of enactment, before or during the shooting war, or after the cessation of
hostilities, might be an important indication), rather than by an a priori reliance on any




With no other compelling criteria to rely upon, the Court here ac-
cepted not only official determinations of fact but also the political
decision qualifying these facts as either war or peace.10 7
2. The Need for Uniformity of Decision
The information problem as such throws doubt only upon the
Court's ability to arrive at a correct determination of the facts upon
which its legal evaluation would have to be based. The duration of war
cases, however, point to an additional aspect of the political question-
the Court's deference to the prior decisions of another department
within the latter's sphere of specific responsibility. On somewhat nar-
rower grounds the political question doctrine will often, especially in
the "recognition" cases, be justified by the practical need for "uni-
formity at home for dealing abroad":
If this were not the rule, cases might often arise in which, on the
most important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there would be
an irreconcilable difference between the executive and judicial
departments. By one of these departments a foreign island or
country might be considered as at peace with the United States;
whilst the other would consider it in a state of war. No well regu-
lated government has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise, and so
destructive of national character. 08
By itself, this rationale might seem wholly persuasive only in situa-
tions where the correctness of the political decision is undisputed, in
which case there would be no need for the political question. But
where, as in the cases concerning the extent of American territorial
sovereignty, 199 the validity of this political assertion is the very question
in issue, it appears at least problematical if the Court defers without
examination to a possibly unlawful political determination. At least in
the Court's normal constitutional practice, the desire for unity among
the departments must give way to the demand for lawfulness of govern-
mental action.
For international law questions, however, this preference seems less
dearly established in the decisions of the Court200 Admittedly, inter-
197. Of course, in the Civil War cases these political decisions were themselves ambig-
uous, and the Court had to choose between a number of Presidential acts and proclama-
tions to determine the duration of war. Similarly, in the cases concerning the Spanish-
American War, the Court had to decide whether mar in the international sense had
been terminated by Presidential proclamation or by the later ratification of the treaty
of peace. Hijo v. United States, note 196 supra.
198. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
199. See note 89 supra.
200. For a recent re-examination of the broader problem in terms of the existence or
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national law is part of the law which the Court will apply; the cases deal-
ing with the validity of treaties after a war between the United States
and its partner state,201 or applying the international law of prize,202 are
familiar proof of this rule. But at the same time, these decisions do not
seem to establish the proposition that the Court will defend the interna-
tional legal order against American acts of government in the same way
in which it defends the constitutional order against such acts. It seems
significant that in the early prize cases decided against the government,
the Court refused to consider the question whether the seizure of ships
or enemy assets was valid under international law and decided the
cases on the constitutional theory that the executive department could
not act without legislative authorization. 203 In the Civil War, the Court
was forced to abandon this constitutional rule and to recognize an in-
dependent war power of the President. This result then forced the Court
to determine the validity of executive decisions under international
law,20 4 and in the celebrated Paquete Habana decision, the Court did
absence of a significant consensus among major nations, see FALK, TI=a ROLE ov Dotrsric
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964). Professor Falk's call for judicial
activism, rather than deference to national policy, in those areas where an international
consensus should exist, does not seem to remove the functional difficulties in those
instances where the Court is faced with a prior commitment of the United States in an
international dispute.
201. See note 101 supra.
202. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Hampton, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 372 (1867).
203. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Little v. Barreme,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). In the former case, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the
rules of international law governing the seizure of enemy assets are "a guide which the
sovereign follows or abandons at will," but that the decision whether the United States
should seize such assets was for Congress to make. 12 U.S. at 128-29. See also In re
Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892). The case dealt with the seizure of a British scaler 59 miles
off the Alaskan coast under a statute for the protection of seal fisheries within "all the
dominion of the United States in the Waters of Behring Sea." The issue, which the Court
managed to avoid on procedural grounds, was whether this "dominion of the United
States" was to be defined with reference to the Three Mile rule of international law, or
with reference to the claims which had been asserted by Russia before the cession of
Alaska, and which were presently asserted by the executive department In its negotiations
with Britain. The Court expressed some doubts about the legitimacy of applying the
political question doctrine to this issue, but made it quite clear that it would be bound
by an express Congressional assertion of the American territorial claims, or by a clear
Congressional authorization of the President to determine this question.
204. See, e.g., The Hampton, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 372 (1867) (holding that even after the
enactment of the Confiscation Acts of 1861 which contained some safeguards for the
property of loyal Southerners, the President could proceed under the international law
of prize); The Prize Cases, 7 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (upholding as justified by Inter-
national law the seizure of blockade runners at a time when Congress had not yet had
any opportunity to deal with Lincoln's blockade proclamations).
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indeed hold that the seizure of small fishing vessels in the Spanish-
American War was contrary to international law and therefore in-
valid.205 But it must be remembered that the Court took pains to em-
phasize that the officer responsible for the seizure had acted without
specific authorization of the Navy Department and that the President
himself had proclaimed the American intention to conduct the war
according to the rules and customs of international law. -00
If these qualifications were not controlling, the Paquete Habana
would not be typical of the Court's normal practice of decision. As I have
pointed out above, the Court has usually decided the constitutional
questions concerning international agreements and territorial bound-
aries, but has, as a rule, treated the corresponding questions of inter-
national law as "political."207 The reason which the Court gave in a
territorial boundaries case for its reluctance to apply international law
against the American government seems to have more general
relevance:
A question of disputed boundary between two sovereign inde-
pendent nations, is, indeed, much more properly a subject for dip-
lomatic discussion, and of treaty, than of judicial investigation.-203
The international order has its own processes for the settlement of
disputes between nations, and in these processes the American position
must be defined, presented and defended by the political departments
of the government. Of course, the Court will not lightly assume that
Congress or the Executive has chosen to disregard its international
duties, and therefore it will whenever possible interpret statutes so that
they will not conflict with international law-v2t or with treaty obliga-
205. 175 US. 677 (1900).
206. Id. at 712-13.
Even the passage which is usually quoted from the opinion does not seem to assume
that rules of customary international law should take precedence over legislative enact-
ments or presidential orders:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations....
Id. at 700. (Emphasis supplied.)
207. See cases cited notes 86-91 supra.
208. Here the Court managed to avoid the problem by deciding the case on other
grounds. De La Croix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599, 600 (1827).
209. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. 571, 578 (1953); The Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch.) 65, 118 (1804). See also United States v. Percheman, 32 US. (7 Pet.) 51,
87-8 (1833); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 741 (1832), overruling Foster
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions;210 and the Court will intervene against violations of international
law which can be attributed to officers acting without clear Presidential
authorization. But when Congress, in a statute like the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act,21 ' has clearly expressed its will to disregard a treaty obliga-
tion, or when the President himself has so acted, international responsi-
bility has been assumed by those departments which under constitu-
tional and international law are authorized to commit the nation. In
such a situation, the international conflict could not be resolved before
a domestic court, if only because the foreign party to the dispute is not
subject to its jurisdiction. As the Court pointed out as early as 1796:
If we are to declare, whether Great Britain or the United States,
have violated a treaty we ought to have some way of bringing the
parties before us. 212
If the ultimate determination of the international dispute must be left
to the processes of settlement provided by the international order, then
the Court's opinion would be provisional, rather than final, with
respect to the international issue in dispute, and it might prejudice
the American position for the formulation and presentation of which
the political departments must assume full responsibility. As an un-
failing support for the rightness of American claims (which might be
tactically motivated and which might change) would jeopardize the
integrity of the judicial process, the political question doctrine is a
legitimate means for the Court to delimit its responsibility in inter-
national conflicts to which the United States is a party.
Uniformity, as a rationale for the political question, however, is
fully persuasive only for international issues on which the political
departments have in fact committed the United States. When there is
no such prior political determination, the Court may justifiably decide
even questions that might give rise to an international dispute, as it
did in the cases concerning the continuing validity of treaties after an
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 312-14 (1829), on a point of interpretation of the Spanish-
American treaty of 1819 by which Florida had been acquired. The interpretation finally
adopted relied on the Spanish, rather than the American, text of tile treaty, and con-
flicted with the interpretation which the political departments seemed to have accepted.
In the Percheman case, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the new interpretation was
to be preferred because it was in harmony with the rule of international law that vested
rights should not be affected by a change of sovereignty.
210. See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895); United States
v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883).
211. 25 Stat. 504 (1888). See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889).
212. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796).
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intervening war between the United States and its partner state.213 The
case for independent judicial determination appears even stronger in
fields of law where the claims of foreign states are specifically addressed
to the judicial power of the United States, and where the Courts, rather
than the political departments, are the institutions with primary re-
sponsibility for formulating and applying the American response to
these claims. In such situations, the postulated "need for uniformity"
might well cut the other way and oblige the State Department to ac-
cept, and defend against complaining foreign governments, the Ameri-
can position as defined by the courts. In my opinion, this is particularly
true for the immunity from suit of foreign government-owned or gov-
ernment-operated vessels,214 and it may also be true (but I am unwilling
to enter the fray over Sabbatino) for the question of what effect should
be given to the acts of foreign goverments, whether recognized or un-
recognized. 215 The fact that the Court has applied the political ques-
tion doctrine to the issues of sovereign immunity and the recognition
of foreign governmental acts cannot be satisfactorily explained by the
rationale which I have outlined above. And the Court has, in fact,
attempted to support these cases by the much farther-reaching thesis
that it should avoid any possibility of "embarrassing" the conduct of
foreign affairs216
213. See note 101 supra.
214. See note 133 supra.
The State Department seems to have been quite willing to leave this responsibility to
the courts. See, e.g., its communication in The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 479-80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1921):
In cases of private litigation in American ports involving merchant vessels owned by
foreign governments, the Department has made it a practice carefully to refrain
from taking any action which might constitute an interference by the authorities of
this government in such litigation.
The extreme reluctance of the Department to take an unambiguous position on such
issues was also evident in Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941).
And even the Tate Letter continued to assume "that a shift in policy by the executive
cannot control the courts." 26 DEr'T STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
215. See notes 95-96 supra.
216. Similar apprehensions had earlier contributed to the adoption of the extensive
doctrine granting immunity regardless of the commercial character of the ship. See cs-
pecially, The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1919):
If the Republic of Chile considers it a governmental function to go into the
carrying trade.. . that is the business of the Republic of Chile; and if we do not
approve of it... then we must say so through diplomatic channels and not through
the judiciary. Otherwise, the judiciary are really contributing to what might be-
come, under conceivable circumstances, a casus bell.
This is, of course, very similar to the Sabbatino rationale for the act of state doctrine,
and subject to similar objections.
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3. The Deference to the Wider Responsibilities of the Political
Departments
Embarrassment, as a rationale for the political question appears
particularly problematical because it reaches beyond international law
and would remove questions of domestic law from judicial competence
without any easily conceivable limits to its thrust. In Chicago & South-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., the Court refused to review
the grant to a domestic company of a license for international air trans-
portation which had been modified and approved by the President.
Plaintiff, a domestic competitor, had attacked the validity of the license
on grounds with which the President had not been concerned, alleging
that the Civil Aeronautics Board had disregarded minimum statu-
tory requirements for issuing a license. Justice Jackson, speaking for
the majority, held that the Court could not even review the validity
of the underlying Board decision because this might embarrass or
interfere with the effective exercise of the President's power to approve
or disapprove such licenses with a view to the requirements of foreign
policy or defense:
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is poli.
tical, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Con-
stitution to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.217
But of course one may with some justification describe many if not
most political decisions as "delicate" and "complex," and to varying
degrees they will all rest upon not entirely verifiable prognoses of the
future. Stated so broadly, this rationale might undermine judicial re-
view as effectively as the theory which would base the political ques-
tion upon the relevance of extra-legal factors. It is therefore important
to examine the cases relying upon "embarrassment" in order to iden-
tify the criteria which justify and limit this rationale.
Of particular interest are the cases which seem most difficult to
reconcile with the Court's function "to say what the law is," the deci-
sions concerning the constitutionality of exclusions and deportations. 218
217. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
218. (1) Exclusion: The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), established two
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The majority of these cases were decided on their merits for the govern-
ment; the infrequent exceptions concerned violations of procedural
due process in deportation proceedings and would not have frustrated
propositions: (a) whether Congress in passing an exclusion act contrary to the terms of a
treaty has violated the international obligations of the United States, is a political question
which will not be examined by the Court; (b) the power to exclude foreigners is "an
incident of sovereignty" which as such must be free from any substantive limitations. See
also Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (the First Amendment does not stand in the
way of a statute excluding anarchists) and Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 45 U.S. 206 at 222-24 (1953), where he con-
ceded to the majority the inapplicability of the standards of substantive due process.
While the rule that there are no substantive constitutional limitations upon the power
to exclude aliens was applied consistently, the question whether a minimum of procedural
due process should apply even to exclusion decisions has given the Court more trouble
and has ultimately brought into play the political question doctrine. The point of de-
parture is marked by decisions like Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 US. 651 (1S92)
and Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895), holding that the decision of the
immigration authorities, barring an alien who claimed that under the terms of the
immigration laws he should be permitted to enter, was final, and that the courts (upon
a petition of habeas corpus) could neither review the correctness of the administrator's
findings, nor the fairness of the procedure by which the decision 'was reached. As to an
alien seeking entry, any procedure authorized by Congress was due process. Shortly
thereafter, however, the Court began to insist upon a minimum of procedural due
process for the decision to deport an alien who had entered in violation of the immigra-
tion laws and had been apprehended only four days after her entry: Yamataya v. Fisher,
189 US. 86 (1903). While this was technically a deportation case, these rules were im-
mediately applied to exclusion decisions where the person excluded claimed to be a
native-born citizen: Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); Tang Tun v. Edsell,
223 U.S. 673 (1912); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 US. 454 (1920); Quon Quon Poy v. John-
son, 273 U.S. 352 (1927). And in Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), the Court ordered the
admission of an alien who had been excluded on the basis of an erroneous interpretation
of the immigration laws, holding that such an exclusion 'was no more valid "than a
decision without a fair hearing which has been held to be bad," citing Chin Yow. supra,
and two deportation cases.
Thus, while most cases continued to go for the government on their merits, the Court
seems to have assumed from there on that the Fifth Amendment required a minimum
of procedural due process even for the exclusion decision, and that to this extent judicial
review was available to the alien: Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336
US. 806 (1949); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 US. 329, 335-36
(1932). In view of this development, it seems to me that the Court's return to its original
position that "whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned" must be understood as an application of the
political question doctrine. United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 US. 537,
544 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 45 U.S. 206 (1953); Leng May Ma
v. Barber, 557 US. 185 (1958); Rogers v. Quan, 357 US. 193 (1958). But see: United States
ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958). This political-question character
seems to me most obvious in the Mezei case where petitioner, after twenty-five years of
residence, had left the United States for a visit abroad and, upon his return, was denied
entry "for security reasons" which were never disclosed to him and, of coure, without
a hearing. As both he and the State Department had failed to get him admitted into any
other country, the Court's dismissal of his petition of habeas corpus (which had been
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the government's policies to any significant degree. The political ques-
tion doctrine was applied only in a handful of cases in which the
measures challenged were so hair-raising that an affirmation on the
successful below) meant that his detention at Ellis Island would continue indefinitely.
As Justice Jackson, dissenting, pointed out, it was impossible to hold that, as a matter
of constitutional law, the government could decide to indefinitely incarcerate a person
without any procedural safeguards whatever. The majority position becomes tenable only
if understood as a decision to accept without examination the Congressional determination
of the Fifth-Amendment issue.
(2) Deportation: After a sweeping assertion of the political-question character of the
deportation decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court
soon recognized the applicability of minimal standards of procedural due process in the
Yamataya case, supra, and has since then consistently adhered to this position. See, e.g.,
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912);
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924);
United States ex rel. Vatjauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Kwong Hal Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). But see Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), where
the decision to deport an alien enemy was held to be immune to all judicial scrutiny.
While permitting judicial review of the procedural fairness of a deportation decision,
the Court has consistently refused to enforce any substantive limitations upon the power
of Congress to order the "deportation of aliens whose presence in this country It deems
hurtful." However, as Siegfried Hesse has shown, this rule was developed In cases where
constitutional objections were either not raised at all, or where any substantive due
process claim would have been quite insubstantial because the deportees had either
entered the country unlawfully or had, soon after entry, engaged in activities from which
it could be inferred that, at the time of entry, they had belonged to the class of Immi-
grants who were to be excluded. Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Ad-
mitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959); Hesse,
The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Allen: The
Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959). In addition to tile cases
cited above, see Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276 (1922); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
The unambiguous assertion that a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien could
be deported for reasons which arose long after entry appeared first in a dictum in Carl-
son v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534-37 (1952), and became the basis of the decisions in
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
While the Court in both cases emphasized the peculiarly "political" nature of the power
to deport and its close relationship to the conduct of foreign affairs over which the Court
disclaimed any pretensions of control, the opinions also relied heavily on the language of
the earlier cases which were (permissive) constitutional decisions on tile merits. Again,
I read Harisiades and Galvan as political-question cases because they appear to me inde.
fensible as determinations of the constitutional issues raised. Granted the wide sweep of
the foreign-relations and war powers, their exercise is still subject to the due-process
requirement of a minimal rational relationship to a proper governmental purpose if
severe deprivations are to be inflicted upon an individual. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Chastleton Corp.
v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). If this is the constitutional standard, it seems Impossible
to conclude that there should be nothing wrong with deporting (to their non-Communist
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merits seemed indefensible, while any intervention in favor of the
petitioners would have considerably limited the government's freedom
of action. Again it was Justice Jackson who attempted to justify these
results on functional grounds. A more humane treatment of aliens,
here and abroad, might be most desirable; however,
It should not be initiated by judicial decision which can only
deprive our own Government of a power of defense and reprisal
without obtaining for American citizens abroad reciprocal privi-
leges or immunities. Reform in this field must be entrusted to the
branches of the Government in control of our international rela-
tions and treaty making powers. 19
The decision to deport an alien is here seen as part of an international
context of interaction of which only one segment, the actions and
reactions of the American government, could potentially be controlled
by the Court's choice of policy. By determining only this partial aspect
of the problem, the Court might prevent or make more difficult an
appropriate inclusive solution.220
The more limited rationale which emerges from these cases is that the
Court will hesitate to limit the freedom of action of those departments
which have a responsibility for dealing with the broader context
beyond the limits of the Court's power to shape and to control.2- 1 Just
countries of origin) aliens who had lived in the United States since their early youth,
whose spouses and children were native-born citizens, and whose association with the
Communist Party had ended long ago and had been lawful at the time, or who had been
unaware of the Party's objectives at the time of their membership in a "front organiza-
tion." Rather than holding that these deportations were reasonably related to proper
foreign relations or war power purposes, the cases decided that it was for Congress. rather
than for the Court, to make this constitutional judgment. See also Built, Deportation
as a Denial of Substantive Due Process, 28 WASH. L. REv. 205 (1953); Note, Deportation
and Due Process, 5 STAN. L. REv. 722 (1953); Comment, Deportation and Exclusion: A
Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YAm. .J. 760 (1952); Note,
Resident Aliens and Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 Vur-.. L. Rzv. 566 (1953).
219. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580, 591 (1952).
220. In the Sabbatino case, Justice Harlan pointed to a somewhat similar problem,
explaining that judicial determination of the validity of foreign expropriations could
only have an occasional impact, depending upon the fortuitous circumstance of the
property in question being brought into the United States. On those occasions, how-
ever, they might seriously interfere with negotiations carried on by the Executive Depart-
ment for the purpose of obtaining general redress for all claimants. 376 U.S. 393, 431-32
(1964).
221. A similar rationale has been suggested by Professor Jaffe:
We might conclude that it is not the subject matter as such which is political
(though foreign affairs might appear to suggest the contrary). It is rather that the
question is one for the decision of which there are no wel-developed principles, or
the issue is felt to be so closely related to a complex of decisions not within the
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as in Mississippi v. Johnson22 the Court would not enjoin the Presi-
dent from enforcing the Reconstruction Acts because it could not have
protected him against the threat of impeachment if he had obeyed the
Court's order, the Court will also exercise restraint in situations where
its decision might frustrate or embarrass the government's conduct of
foreign affairs.
Of course, it is easy to overstate the dangers of embarrassment
abroad, and I am convinced that the Court has in numerous instances
misjudged and overestimated these implications. In the deportation
case for which Justice Jackson has formulated this rationale, it is
quite difficult to see how the expulsion of permanent resident aliens
who for over thirty years had lived in the United States, because of
their former membership in the Communist party, could be regarded
as the exercise of a "power of defense and reprisal" against their non-
Communist states of origin, or how the recognition of a substantive
due process claim with a view to the extraordinary equities of these
cases could have interfered with the evolution of international stan-
dards for the protection of aliens. Equally vulnerable are the sovereign
immunity cases, which the Court has explained on the ground that
"every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction over the
vessels of a foreign government has its effect upon our relations with
that government" and that therefore "the courts should not so act as to
embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs." 25 This
contention has been persuasively answered by the suggestion, which
has now found support in the Sabbatino case,224 that the State Depart-
ment may be much more embarrassed by the necessity to take a stand
on questions of this nature than by the need to explain the decisions of
American courts to a foreign government. 225 And it seems even less
court's jurisdiction that its resolution by the court would either be poor in Itself
or would jeopardize sound decisions in the larger complex.
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAav. L. REv. 1265, 1304
(1961).
222. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867).
223. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
224. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964). Justice Harlan
dealt here with a suggested extension of the Bernstein exception which would have limited
the application of the act-of-state doctrine to those cases in which the State Department
has expressly stipulated that it does not wish the courts to pass on the validity of foreign
acts. If such a doctrine "would work serious inroads on the maximum effectiveness of
United States diplomacy," it is hard to see why the similar involvement of the Depart-
ment in immunity cases should have the opposite effect of preventing "embarrassment"
for American diplomacy.
225. This objection seems to have been first raised in Note, Judicial Deference to the
State Department on International Legal Issues, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 91 (1948). See also
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persuasive that Justice Jackson, dissenting in the Vermilya-Brown
case 6 would have deferred to the State Department's remonstration
on the question whether the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1939 should
be construed as applying to American employers and employees work-
ing on United States bases in the Bermudas which had been leased
from Great Britain. There was no doubt that Congress could govern
the conduct of American citizens abroad, and it was made quite clear
by the majority that the application of the Act would not be based on
the assumption that the United States exercised international sover-
eignty on the Bermudas. Still, the State Department was concerned
that Britain might somehow misunderstand the decision and take of-
fense, and Jackson would have regarded that concern as controlling.
But after all this has been said, there remains for certain situations
a legitimate concern that the Court might interfere with the broader
responsibilities of the political departments. Thus, in United States v.
Pink.227 the Court found it necessary to accept the "policy of recogni-
tion" implied in the Litvinov Assignment as controlling for the ques-
tion of the validity of Soviet expropriations in order to avoid any interfer-
ence with the President's attempt to deal with the problem of Russian
debts as a political prerequisite for recognition.2-8
4. Normative Limitations of the Political Question
Foreign affairs is surely not the only field in which the Court is faced
with problems of information and responsibility; at the very least the
cases which dealt with military measures in war or, more generally, with
measures taken in the interest of national security, would seem to have
presented functional difficulties of a very similar order. But in spite of
these similarities, the political question doctrine has found only very
limited application in the war and security cases. I am persuaded that
this difference can be explained by the prevalence of constitutional
issues in this area.
In the great majority of these cases, the Court has upheld challenged
measures as not unconstitutional; the case went against the government
McDouGAL & Bu E, THE Punuc ORDER or Tim OcExNs 154 (19622; Lauterpaclt, The
Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brr. YB. INT'L L. 220. 240
(1951).
226. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390-409 (1948).
227. 815 U.S. 203 (1942). See also note 95 supra.
228. Similar considerations may also explain the conflicting decisions concerning the
constitutional time limits for the- exercise of the war power, which the Court has usually
regarded as a justiciable issue, applying the political question doctrine only in cases
affecting alien enemies. See note 195 (8) supra.
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in only a few celebrated decisions concerning violations of important
constitutional rights, 229 which decisions were often announced after the
emergency that gave rise to the violation had passed. And even in the
field of foreign affairs, where the functional grounds for abstention are
strongest, the Court has, at least in one line of cases, 23 0 enforced the
standards of the Bill of Rights without any deference to the inter-
national responsibilities of the government. It seems, therefore, that
the Court is limiting the thrust of the functional rationales for the
political question by a normative qualification: where important indi-
vidual rights are at stake, the doctrine will not be applied. Apart from
the exclusion and deportation cases in which the Court, not altogether
persuasively, found the due-process issue overshadowed by the question
of American policies towards the alien's state of origin, there seem to be
very few exceptions231 to the general rule that the Court will not apply
the doctrine to the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. This does not mean,
of course, that the Court has always been a very "activist" defender of
individual rights. It may avoid such issues on procedural or jurisdic-
tional grounds, it may delay decisions until the war is won, or it may
uphold military measures on the narrowest possible grounds. But it
seems that the Court is quite unwilling to abdicate its responsibility
for ultimately (which has often meant: in the post-war period and
with a view to influencing governmental conduct in future crises) strik-
ing the balance between military power and individual rights. The very
fact that it has sometimes, particularly with regard to Japanese reloca-
tion and martial rule on Hawaii,2 32 disregarded considerable functional
doubts about its capacity to arrive at realistic and responsible decisions
seems to show that the Court finds the determination of such issues so
central to its function that it is willing to pay a very high price in order
to avoid a general delegation of this task to the political or military
authorities. And now that the Court has chosen to remove the political-
question cloud from malapportionment by defining the issue in terms
of individual rights violated, the empirical argument for this norma-
tive limitation of the political question doctrine appears even stronger.
229. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Duncan v. Kahana-
moku, 327 U.S. 804 (1946); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921);
Ex parte MiUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 US. (13 How.)
115 (1851).
250. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 861 US. 281 (1960); Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 861 U.S. 234 (1960), Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1 (1957).
231. The clearest of these exceptions, Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), was all
but overruled by Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
232. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 804 (1946).
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The political question also has had no place when the Court was
presented with conflicting claims of competence among the depart-
ments of the federal government, or between the federal government
and the states. Such issues were decided on their merits even in the
field of the foreign affairs powers 3 and The Steel Seizure Case2- 4 and
The Pocket Veto Case25 confirm this rule for the allocation of com-
petence in the fields of the emergency power and of legislative power.
Of these, at least The Steel-Seizure Case raised serious functional prob-
lems of information and responsibility2aO However, if the Court had
deferred to the claims asserted by one of the conflicting departments,
such a decision would have delegated to that department general com-
petence to allocate competence under the Constitution, and would
have been a constitutional decision of much greater import than a
decision on the merits.27
While the application of the political question to conflicts among
the departments of the federal government appears theoretically im-
possible-to which of these co-equal branches of the government
should the Court have delegated the power to settle their dispute?-
this is not quite as categorically true for conflicts between the federal
government and the states. It is at least conceivable that the political
question doctrine, rather than the permissive interpretation of enumer-
ated federal powers, might have been employed to give the federal
government plein pouvoir with respect to the states. But here, too, the
Court has refused to abdicate its responsibility for the authoritative
determination of questions of competence.
The only instances in which the doctrine was clearly applied 2s to a
233. See cases cited notes 86, 88 supra.
234. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
235. 279 U.S. 655 (1929). The Court has also decided that a two-thirds majority of the
members present (provided they constitute a quorum), rather than two-thirds of all
members of both Houses, was sufficient to override a presidential veto. M fissouri Pac. Ry.
v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919).
236. It has been suggested that a shortage of ammunitions in Korea resulted from the
strike which the decision made possible. See HART & WECSLER. Tim FEDERAL CourTs A.,D
TE FEDEaA. SysrFzr 1211 (1953).
237. Field v. Clark, 143 US. 649 (1892), and the other political question cases con-
cerning legislative procedure, cases cited note 106 supra, are not in conflict with this
rule. Of course, they dealt with questions of competence in the context of the legislative
process. But, as I pointed out above, there were no conflicting claims of competence
involved. The legislative majorities which allegedly had been deceived would have been
in an optimal position to ascertain the true facts and to prevent or correct any inroads
upon their power to decide. Their acquiescence was, therefore, conclusive evidence that
no such infringements had in fact occurred.
238. I do not regard Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 475 (1867), Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867), and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), as
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constitutional question of federal power are the cases dealing with the
status of Indian tribes.239 As long as the objects of federal regulation
were Indians in the racial and cultural sense,240 and as long as their
numbers in the territory to which the regulation applied had not
become totally insignificant,241 the Court would defer to the federal
government on the constitutional issue of whether the process of their
assimilation had reached a stage in which the exercise of a special pro-
tective power of the federal government was no longer justified. To the
extent that such federal regulations displaced the general governmental
powers of the states within which these Indians resided, the federal
government was in fact invested with a limited competence to allocate
competence. This result conflicts with the normative limitation of the
political question which I have suggested; it appears that the Court was
persuaded of the hostility of the states against the Indians, 242 and there-
fore sought to maximize the scope of federal protection.243
clear exceptions to this rule. While in all these opinions there are political question
overtones, it seems to me that the results are very closely tied to the jurisdictional and
procedural constellations of the concrete cases, turning on the nature of the interest
asserted by the parties plaintiff, or on the nature of the remedy sought against a partic-
ular defendant, without categorically putting the issues themselves beyond the Court's
competence to decide, as a political question decision would have done. See supra note
122. The same is, of course, true for Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
See note 120 supra. It is true that Chief Justice Marshall expressed doubts about the
Court's competence to decide even if the Cherokees bad been a "foreign state" within
the meaning of Art. III. But these doubts concerned the propriety of enjoining the
legislature of Georgia and of restraining its physical force, not the Court's competence to
decide the issue as such "in a proper case, with proper parties." Id. at 20.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); United States v. Rickert, 188 US. 432 (1903); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Holliday, 70 US, (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866).
240. United States v. Sandoval, supra note 239, at 46:
Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body
of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian
tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions
whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt
with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United
States are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.
This case overruled United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877), on the question of whether
the Pueblos were subject to the federal power over Indians.
241. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914), Johnson v. Gealds, 234 U.S. 422,
447 (1914).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 US. 375, 383.84 (1886):
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent
on the United States. . . . Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power.
243. See PosT, THE SUPREMtE COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 112-18 (1936).
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5. Additional Factors of the Political Question
I have so far tried to show that the Court may apply the political
question doctrine when its access to relevant information is insufficient
to assure the correct determination of particular issues, when the Court
would have to question the position taken by the government in an
international dispute, or when an independent determination by the
Court would interfere with the specific responsibilities of another de-
partment for dealing with a wider context which itself would be
beyond the Court's reach. But even though one or more of these factors
may be present, the Court will not usually apply the doctrine to the
constitutional guarantees of individual rights and to conflicts of com-
petence among the departments of the federal government and between
the federal government and the states. These factors would seem to
explain the patterns of decisions in the fields of the foreign relations
and war powers and of legislative procedure. The only political ques-
tion cases that cannot readily be explained by the functional considera-
tions outlined above are the cases arising under the guarantee clause.
In addition, the position taken by Justice Black in his concurring
opinion in Coleman v. Miller244 points to an important, though
unique, functional factor for the political question which merits further
discussion.
As was pointed out above, in the Coleman case the Court refused to
review the validity of Kansas' ratification of the Child Labor Amend-
ment which had been proposed by Congress in order to overcome the
effect of the Court's constitutional holding in Hammer v. Dagenhart.245
The Chief Justice and two other members of the majority in Coleman
held that it was for Congress to determine whether the proposed
amendment had lost its vitality because more than a "reasonable time"
had elapsed since its proposal. Justice Black, in an opinion which was
joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas, would have
given the political question doctrine a much wider sweep. In his
view, Article V granted "power over the amending of the Consti-
tution to Congress alone." This power was "complete" and "ex-
clusive," and the amending process itself was "'political' in its entirety,
from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitu-
tion, and... not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference
at any point."248 Accordingly, the Chief Justice was wrong in retaining
for the Court the task of constitutional interpretation, leaving to Con-
gress only the application of Court-defined standards to the facts deter-
244. 507 US. 433, 459 (1939).
245. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
246. 307 US. at 459.
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mined by Congress. If Congressional power was exclusive, the Court
was "wholly without constitutional authority" to express any opinion
on the proper interpretation of Article V. Justice Black did not explain
why this should be so, and he chose not to discuss the precedents which
were against him.247 I am inclined, however, to accept the wisdom of his
conclusions as a recognition of the inherent limits of the power of
judicial review in a democratic polity.
Whether judicial review of legislation is expressly established by the
Constitution, as it is in West Germany, or whether the power has been
seized by the Court in the absence of a compellingly clear textual au-
thorization, its exercise will necessarily exist in tension with the demo-
cratic principle of majority rule. The more it becomes obvious that
constitutional interpretation is not the exercise in pure logic for which
Chief Justice John Marshall tried to pass it off in Marbury v. Madison,
that it requires the Court to choose among alternative policies and
among conflicting values, and that reasonable men might reasonably
differ about many of these choices, the more obvious and the more im-
portant is the need for relating judicial review to democratic principle.
It is very well to assert that this is a society deeply committed to the
rule of principle, and that judicial review is no more than the expres-
sion of the "sober second thought of the community," but it is surely
no longer enough merely to postulate the identity of the Court's inter-
pretation with this community consensus, or to refer to it in the purely
fictitious sense in which Hamilton referred to the "people" in No. 78
of the Federalist. The reference must have a core of realism, and there
may be no better way of assuring its continuing realism than the proc-
esses by which the community, if upon second thought it should still
disagree with the Court, is able to override its vetoes. The Court's own
sensitivity to the community consensus is part of these processes, as is
the President's strategic employment of his power to appoint the mem-
247. The Court had consistently decided on their merits all constitutional questions
arising from the amending process, but it should also be noted that all these decisions
had gone against the challengers: Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 881
(1798) (the President does not participate in the proposal of an amendment); Hawke v.
Smith No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (the states may not submit the ratification decision to a
popular referendum); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 250, 386 (1920) (proposal by two
thirds of both Houses of Congress requires only the assent of two thirds of the members
present as long as these constitute a quorum to do business); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130 (1922) (the states cannot exclude or restrict the power of their legislatures to ratify
amendments to the federal constitution); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931)
(Congress may choose ratification by state legislatures rather than by conventions, even If
the amendment should enlarge federal powers at the expense of "powers reserved to the
people" by the Tenth Amendment).
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bers of the Court. Congressional power to regulate and to withdraw the
Court's appellate jurisdiction may be used as an emergency brake with
the undesirable consequences which the simile suggests. But it is surely
the most direct, the most weighty and the most legitimate manifestation
of the democratic principle if the community undertakes to go through
the cumbersome deliberative process of constitutional amendment in
order to express its consensus about what ought to be. It is one thing
for the Court to strike down the Child Labor Law as incompatible with
its choice of constitutional values, and it is difficult enough to square
this with democratic principle, but it would seem to be quite a different
matter if the Court could, by a narrow interpretation of the amend-
ment procedures, prevent the ratification of the amendment which was
intended to overrule Hammer v. Dagenhart.2 4s Of course, the amend-
ment process is itself governed by the Constitution, and it is by no
means inconceivable that an amendment might be unconstitutional.
But this seems to be one instance in which the Court cannot assume
responsibility for saying "what the law is" without, at the same time,
undermining the legitimacy of its power to say so. I do not find it
paradoxical to insist that judicial review in a democracy remains
defensible only to the extent that the Court itself will be defenseless
against the processes through which the community may assert and
enforce its own considered understanding of its basic code.
It is much more difficult to find a functional explanation for all of
the guarantee-clause cases. At the outset, it seems necessary to distin-
guish between two different problem situations: those involving the
recognition of a state government, and those involving challenges to
individual state measures as violative of the standards of republican
government. In Luther v. Borden,-49 the Court was directly faced with
the need to decide which of two competing groups, the "Charter"
government or the Dorr government elected under the "People's
Constitution," had been the lawful government of Rhode Island dur-
ing a period of revolutionary unrest in 1842. Chief Justice Taney
explained that this was primarily a question of state law which the
state courts had decided in favor of the Charter government. And to
the extent that the federal government had any constitutional warrant
for interfering with such contests, Article IV § 4 of the Constitution =0
had delegated this power to the political departments:
248. Supra note 245.
249. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
250. The United States shall guarantee to enery State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
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Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For as
the United States guarantee to each State a republican govern-
ment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is estab-
lished in the State before it can determine whether it is republican
or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the
government under which they are appointed, as well as its republi-
can character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority.
And its decision is binding on every other department of the
government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribu-
nal.... 251
Congress, however, had had no opportunity to seat members from
Rhode Island during the period of unrest, and so the Court turned to
the President's statutory authority to enforce the guarantee against
domestic violence as another source of federal power to recognize state
governments. While the President had not in fact called out the militia,
he had promised to support the Charter government if the necessity
should arise, and this commitment had been decisive for the outcome of
the revolutionary struggle. The Court held that this commitment was
conclusive in the same way in which the President's recognition of a
foreign government would bind the judiciary.25 2
This analogy to the Court's acceptance of the recognition of foreign
governments seems quite persuasive in this situation. In both instances,
there is a problem of information insofar as the result would depend
on whether one or the other of the competing groups had in fact estab-
lished an effective government in the state. To the extent that the deci-
sion would also turn on whether the established de facto government
was the lawful authority in the state, the Court found that the Presi-
dent had committed the federal government in the exercise of his
specific responsibility for maintaining domestic peace. As the Court
would be as unable to control and direct the outcome of a civil war as
it is unable to direct the conduct of foreign powers, it would seem to
follow that it should neither interfere during the struggle, nor express
a belated disapproval of the President's choice.
The actual holding of the case appears to be quite unproblematical,
and as far as the dicta quoted above are concerned, which would have
treated a Congressional determination that the state government was
"republican" as conclusive upon the courts, it should be remembered
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.
251. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 1, 42 (1849). (Footnote omitted.)
252. Id. at 43-4.
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that they appear in a "recognition" case and that they had the purpose
of establishing a Congressional power to determine which of tvo com-
peting groups was the lawful government of the state.
The Court relied upon these dicta for the same purpose in two later
recognition cases. Texas v. White253 held that only Congress had power
to reestablish and to recognize governments in the rebel states. In view
of the fact, however, that in the Reconstruction Acts Congress had
expressly declared the existing Texan government to be illegal and
unrepublican and had not seated Congressmen from the state, the
Court's ability to find an implied recognition of this government in
these same statutes seems evidence for a degree of judicial independence
which was not quite compatible with the postulated "political" charac-
ter of recognition.25 4 The political question doctrine was again applied
in a "recognition" case255 in which the Court had been asked to deter-
mine which of two candidates had been elected Governor of Kentucky.
Insofar as the candidate ousted by the legislature of the state under
rather dubious circumstances had relied on the guarantee clause, the
Court cited Luther v. Borden for the rule that "enforcement of this
guarantee belonged to the political department."2' 0
It seems important, however, that even in the exercise of its guaran-
tee powers Congress is not immune to all judicial scrutiny. Thus in
one case257 the Court found the contract clause violated by a provision
of Georgia's reconstruction constitution the adoption of which had
been required by Congress as a condition for recognizing the state's
government as lawful and republican. And in a later case,2ss the Court
invalidated a provision in the Oklahoma Enabling Act which pro-
253. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1869).
254. Id. at 730-31. See also Justice Griers dissenting opinion, id. at 737, 738.
Mr. Field tried to explain the case by the theory that "a state does not need to have
a republican government in order to maintain suit in the Supreme Court." Field, The
Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MbNN. L. Ray. 485, 503 (1924).
But that would not be enough. The Court would also have had to hold that a state
does not need to have a de jure government in order to sue, which, in view of the cases
denying the right to sue to foreign de facto governments, would have been quite diffiult
to maintain. See also Posr, TrE SurpP sE CouRT AND POLrTCAL QuEso.xs 25-7 (1936).
255. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
256. Id. at 578.
257. White v. Hart, 80 US. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
258. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566, 567 (1911). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US.
533 (1964), in which Chief Justice Warren rejected the argument that Congres, in ad-
mitting new states whose legislatures were not elected under a one-man.one-vote system
of apportionment, had conclusively determined the constitutionality of malapportionment
in the exercise of its guarantee power. Even in the exercise of this competence, the Chief
Justice asserted, "Congress simply lacks the constitutional power to insulate States from
attack with respect to alleged deprivations of individual constitutional rights." /d. at 582.
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hibited for a certain time a change of the state capital, explaining that
even under its guarantee power Congress could not admit a new state
under restrictions which would deprive it of equality with other mem-
bers of the Union.
If the Congressional power to establish, or to recognize, state
governments is not free from judicial control, there would seem to be
even less reason for judicial abstention in situations which do not in-
volve this political recognition at all. This at least seems to have
been the Court's assumption in a number of cases which challenged
state statutes as being repugnant to the standards of republican govern-
ment.25 9 While the Court usually upheld these statutes, it seems to have
had no doubt that the guarantee clause imposed some substantive limi-
tations on the states, and that the Court was capable of defining and
applying these standards.
This evolution of the constitutional law of republican government
was suddenly reversed in Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon.20 Oregon
had, in 1902, adopted a constitutional amendment introducing initia-
tive and referendum procedures, and it had enacted through initiative
a special tax on the gross revenues of telephone and telegraph com-
panies. Defendant company had failed to pay this tax, claiming that
the initiative procedures by which it had been adopted were a form of
direct democracy incompatible with the standards of republican gov-
ernment. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice White, the
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction,
relying on Luther v. Borden as the "leading and absolutely controlling
case."
Why Luther should have been relevant at all becomes clear in the
following passage:
Before immediately considering the text of § 4 of Art. IV ... let
us briefly fix the inconceivable expansion of the judicial power
and the ruinous destruction of legislative authority in matters
purely political which would necessarily be occasioned by giving
sanction to the doctrine which underlies and would be neces-
sarily involved in sustaining the propositions contended for. First.
259. See, e.g., Attorney General of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowry, 199 U.S. 233 (1905)
(republican government not violated by legislative creation and alteration of school
districts); Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897) (republican government Is
not violated by delegation of power to a court to determine municipal boundaries);
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 WaIl.) 162 (1875) (republican government does not re-
quire women suffrage). See also the attempts to define the essential elements of a
republican government found in The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); In re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461, 462 (1891).
260. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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That however perfect and absolute may be the establishment and
dominion in fact of a state government, however complete may
be its participation in and enjoyment of all its powers and rights
as a member of the national Government, and however all the
departments of that Government may recognize such state govern-
ment, nevertheless every citizen of such State or person subject
to taxation therein, or owing any duty to the established govern-
ment, may be heard, for the purpose of defeating the payment of
such taxes or avoiding the discharge of such duty, to assail in a
court of justice the rightful existence of the State. Second. As a
result, it becomes the duty of the courts of the United States, where
such a claim is made, to examine as a justiciable issue the conten-
tion as to the illegal existence of a State and if such contention
be thought well founded to disregard the existence in fact of the
State, of its recognition by all of the departments of the Federal
Government, and practically award a decree absolving from all
obligation to contribute to the support of or obey the laws of such
established state government. And as a consequence of the exist-
ence of such judicial authority a power in the judiciary must be
implied, unless it be that anarchy is to ensue, to build by judicial
action upon the ruins of the previously established government a
new one, a right which by its very terms also implies the power to
control the legislative department of the Government of the
United States in the recognition of such new government and the
admission of representatives therefrom, as well as to strip the exec-
utive department of that government of its otherwise lawful and
discretionary authority.2 - '
After this parade of horribles the ensuing question whether the guaran-
tee clause should bring about "these strange, far-reaching and injurious
results"2 62 was, of course, purely rhetorical. But so, it seems to me, are
the horribles themselves. All this verbiage can be reduced to two prop-
ositions. If the Court should decide the case on its merits, and if it
should hold for defendants, this decision would destroy the validity of
all acts of the state government, freeing the state's citizens from all duty
to obey state law and to pay state taxes, and it would force the Court
into a direct conflict with the recognition powers of Congress and of
the President. Why this should be so is explained only by the postulate
that "it cannot be assumed... that there is at one and the same time
one and the same government which is republican in form and not of
that character."2 3
This is conceptualism in its least attractive form, and prima facie no
more persuasive than the theory that the whole state government
261. Id. at 141-42. (Emphasis added.)
262. Id. at 142.
263. Id. at 141.
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should be unconstitutional if some aspect of the state's criminal pro-
cedure is found wanting under the due process clause. I am unable to
see why the guarantee clause must be read as permitting only one
indivisible characterization of the indivisible legality of the state's
government as such, and why it should be impossible to differentiate
and specify the constitutional implications of republican government,
and to hold that individual state measures are, or are not, in conflict
with specific aspects of this constitutional standard.
It is true that in Luther v. Borden Chief Justice Taney had paraded
similar horribles. 26 4 But there they had some reality because plaintiff
had to argue that the Charter government itself was unlawful and
therefore could not validly authorize the defendant militiamen to break
into his house. Thus, in Luther the unlawfulness of the concrete meas-
ure complained of would have had to follow from the illegality of the
whole government, while here the challenge to a tax allegedly adopted
by an unconstitutional procedure could only by semantic extrapolation
be construed as an attack "on the State as a State." 206
Furthermore, in Luther one of the political departments had in fact
committed the federal government to the recognition of the Charter
government, while here not even Chief Justice White was willing to
assert that Congress had at all concerned itself with the constitu-
tionality of Oregon's initiative and referendum amendments, or that
the admission of Representatives and Senators from Oregon could in
any realistic fashion be construed as an actual political determination
of this issue.
Of course, a decision for defendant in this case would, by implica-
tion, have denied the validity of all laws which had been adopted by
initiative, and depending on their number and importance, this might
indeed have produced some substantial disorder and problems of ad-
justment.2 6 Furthermore, it is not altogether inconceivable that initia-
tive and referendum might have been sufficiently important to catch
the attention of Congress and to bring about a political determination
of their legitimacy.
264. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38-9 (1849).
265. 223 U.S. at 150.
266. If it should have held for defendant on the merits (which seems unlikely), the
Court might have lessened the impact of its decision by applying it prospectively to the
statutes adopted by initiative and referendum, relying on the effectiveness of acts of a
de facto government for such a result. See cases cited note 96 supra and Mauran v.
Insurance Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 (1868); United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 99 (1875), applying the de facto doctrine to acts of the rebel governments. See also
Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649, 669 (1894) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5 (1962)
for the effectiveness of statutes passed by an improperly elected legislature.
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But if the Pacific States decision might find some functional justifica-
tion as a deference to a potential political determination by Congress,
the same can surely not be asserted with regard to many of the later
cases which applied the political question doctrine to all claims raised
under the guarantee clause. The chances are more than remote that
Congress would consistently concern itself with questions such as
whether Nebraska may delegate to an inferior court the power to or-
ganize and manage drainage districts, 10 7 or whether Virginia could dele-
gate to its Milk Commission the power to fix prices for cream,208 or even
whether Ohio could require the concurrence of all but one of the
judges of its Supreme Court for invalidating a statute.-0 These and
similar applications of the Pacific States rule,2 70 can be explained
neither by the magnitude of the problems which a decision on the
merits would have entailed, nor by the superior fitness of a political
decision. They seem to be based on the mechanical invocation of a rule
which had little functional justification even in the case in which it
was first announced.
Of course, in Baker v. Carr, both Justice Brennan271 and Justice
Frankfurter 272 attempted to explain these holdings by the "lack of
criteria by which a court could determine which form of government
was republican." I find this "cognitive" theory as uncompelling here as
it is elsewhere. By the time of the Pacific States decision, the Court had
only begun the task of defining republican government, and it seemed
that its definition would, on the whole, be rather permissive. Now that
the process has been interrupted, it is of course true that the present
contours of the guarantee clause are vague and indefinite. But how
"justiciable" would First-Amendment issues appear today if the process
of interpretation and application had been halted in 1912? However
this may be, if Justice Frankfurter was right in asserting in Baker v.
Carr that "the present case involves all the elements that have made the
Guarantee Clause cases non-justiciable. It is, in effect, a Guarantee
Clause claim masquerading under a different label,"' ' 3 then the Court's
recent apportionment decisions effectively undermine whatever justifi-
267. O'Neill v. Learner, 259 US. 244, 248 (1915).
268. H-ighland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 603, 612 (1937).
269. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Park Dist., 281 US. 74, 79-80 (1930).
270. And see cases discussed in Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4:
A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L REV. 513, 556-58 (1962).
271. 369 U.S. 186, 222-24 (1962).
272. Id. at 289-97.
273. Id. at 297.
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cation there might have been for the later guarantee clause cases. And
I am fully persuaded that Justice Frankfurter was right on this point.1 4
If I have not been able to see the sense of all political question cases,
one must presume that the fault is entirely mine. But whatever sense I
have been able to find seems to point toward an understanding of the
doctrine, which, while perhaps not unimportant, is quite limited in its
scope of actual and potential relevance, and the doctrinal implications
of which appear to be much more modest than those of any of the
theories of political questions which have been discussed.
The emphasis of the political question is on the "foreign relations
law," and within this field on questions of international and domestic
law which immediately concern the political or military interactions of
the United States with foreign states. In this field, the Court is con-
fronted with a wider context in which domestic courts may not be sure
of their grasp of all relevant data and in which they cannot even poten-
tially determine the conduct of all important participants in the process
of interaction. Deference to those departments of the government
which have a specific responsibility for the actions and reactions of the
United States in the external arena would appear to be no more than
the realistic acknowledgment of the functional limitations of the judi-
cial process.
Beyond this, the doctrine has been restricted to a few, narrowly cir-
cumscribed issues of constitutional law. The rationale of the political
question decisions concerning the power over Indians, the amendment
process, and some questions of the legislative process, appears to be
limited to these specific issues, and the potentially most far-reaching ex-
pansion of the doctrine into the field of reapportionment has been
reversed on grounds which may well militate against the further vitality
of the political question even for questions arising under the guarantee
clause. And it is important that, with very few exceptions, the doctrine
has not been permitted to gain a permanent foothold at the core of the
Court's constitutional responsibility for the protection of individual
rights and for the determination of conflicts of competence.
The. major part, at least, of the Court's practice of decision would
seem to need for its justification no more than the acknowledgment that
judicial review, while occasioned in the American system by ordinary
274. See Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 84-7; Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Re-
publican Government, 50 CALF. L. Rxv. 245 (1962).
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litigation, has an impact which reaches far beyond the interests of the
parties litigant in the outcome of their lawsuit, and that the overriding
importance of its authority "to say what the law is" will force the Court
to examine with care its functional capacity to responsibly perform
this broader task with respect to any particular issue that is presented
for its determination. I fail to see why such an acknowledgment should
not even coexist with the premises of the classical theory of judicial
review. Even though I am unable to accept the contention that the
political question doctrine itself should be regarded as the result of an
interpretation of the Constitution,275 it appears to me that a recogni-
tion of functional limitations upon the Court's responsibility will
not undercut the legitimacy of judicial review. Nor do I think that
this recognition will provide the basis for any sweeping theories of
judicial self-limitation. In my understanding of the political question,
the doctrine cannot be regarded as a test for the validity of the compet-
ing theories of judicial review to which I have referred at the beginning
of this article.
275. It would, of course, be theoretically possible to elevate the functional factors
which in my opinion explain the Court's political question practice to the dignity of
constitutional imperatives. But even if it were clearly understood that this assertion
would be no more than a conclusionary label attached to considerations which focus
upon the limitations of the American judicial process, rather than upon the constitu-
tional grants of power to the political departments of the government. I would regard
such an "escalation" as undesirable. With the possible exception of questions regarding
the ratification of constitutional amendments, the considerations which I regard as
legitimately relevant depend upon an assessment of highly variable circumstances. An
information problem may be entirely the product of a particularly fact-oriented de-
finition of substantive standards, or its seriousness may be alleviated by changes in the
quantity and quality of communications or by improvements in the Court's fact-finding
processes. The problem of embarrassment may be of widely differing significance even
for issues which seem very similar, and even where it is serious it may have to be tolerated
when the vindication of important values is at stake. If the Court's judgment that a
particular question under the particular circumstances should be regarded as "political"
is expressed in terms of a constitutional command, this statement will almost inevitably
obscure the need for a close functional analysis in the next case dealing with a seemingly
similar question. The Court has often demonstrated its readiness to use the political
question label uncritically in situations where the functional reasons for avoidance were
far from compelling, and it appears to me that the exceptional character as well as the
flexibility of the political question is better described and better maintained if it is not
characterized as a constitutional rule.
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